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The American judge is somehow expected to judge, really to judge.
In France, the Code is supposed to have already judged.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The French legal system, according to its official pronouncements,
functions on a rigid conception of the interpretive and creative role of the civil,
private law judge. This conception may be thought of as an "official portrait":
It is an image or representation of the judge and of the nature of the judicial
role. The official portrait, whose essence is captured above by Lyotard's
intriguing statement, has been the source of much confusion, especially to
common lawyers. This portrait's predominance in the French legal system, and
its effect on French judicial practice, has never been properly understood, even
by the finest American analysis of the French legal system: John Dawson's
The Oracles of the Law.
2
By demonstrating that the official portrait is but the most visible of several
conceptions of the judicial role currently operating in the French legal system,
this Article seeks to correct the skewed common law accounts of how the
French judicial system actually functions. In the process, this Article exposes
1. Interview with Jean-Frangois Lyotard, council member at the ColIfge International de Philosophic,
in New Haven, Conn. (Jan. 1992). Except where otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.













an entire sphere of French judicial discourse that is kept largely hidden from
the general public, and whose very existence requires novel analysis. This
Article constructs an "unofficial portrait" of the French civil judge, based on
the conceptions of the judicial role prevailing in this hidden discursive sphere.
Finally, it examines the effects that the coexistence of the official and
unofficial portraits produce on French judicial interpretation, discourse, and
rhetoric.
The official French portrait is produced by French legislative enactments,
by judicial interpretations of such enactments, and by the very form of French
judicial opinions. As a public portrait produced by official state institutions, it
has served as the traditional focus of comparative analysis. The official portrait
presents the form and structure of the judicial opinion as the very essence of
the judicial enterprise. This portrait represents an interpretive ideology that
posits a perfectly grammatical mode of reading:3 The French civil law system
is premised on a supposedly all-encompassing and all-generating legal code.
French judicial opinions merely apply the Code, which patterns their syllogistic
form and mechanical structure. Implicit in this official portrait is a definition
of the role of the civil judge: He mechanically (and unproblematically) fits fact
situations into the matrix of the Code. Thus, "the Code is supposed to have
already judged"-the judge is but its passive and invisible agent.
The prominence of the official portrait has masked the fact that the French
civil law system also functions on the basis of other conceptions of how its
judges should and do exercise their role. This Article presents the most
prevalent of these alternative conceptions, and uses them to construct an
unofficial portrait of the French civil judge. This portrait is unofficial because
it is not the official product of state institutions; rather, it is based on
mainstream French academic theory and on the hidden discourse of the French
civil judiciary. It represents the French legal system's internal understanding
of how its judicial system operates.
As early as the turn of the century, French jurists criticized the purely
grammatical mode of reading presented in the Civil Code and in French
judicial opinions.4 According to French academics and judges, a purely
3. The notions of grammar and grammatical reading are borrowed from Paul de Man. See PAUL DE
MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING 3-19, 54-72 (1979); PAUL DE MAN. THE RESISTANCE TO ThEORY 14-20
(1986). Grammatical reading, which de Man associates with "formalism." aspires to an unproblematic and
"impersonally precise" "decoding of a text" based on "a model ... applicable to the generation of all
texts." DE MAN, THE RFSISTANCE TO TFORY. supra, at 16: see DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING. supra.
at 14-15. It assumes that a text's vocabulary and syntax (i.e.. its grammar) can mechanically generate the
proper reading of that text. In the French legal context, it is a mode of reading premised on the notion that
the vocabulary and syntax of the Civil Code can be applied directly to any fact scenano in order to
generate the required legal solution.
Ronald Dworkin prefers to qualify such reading as "acontextual." rather than -literal- or
"mechanical." See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 17-18, 89 (1986).
4. See, e.g., FRAN4;OIS GtNY, MIrTiODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt PosmF (2d
ed. 1919). For a detailed analysis of Grny's critique, see ufra pan IV.
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grammatical method offers no guidance should the grammatical operation of
the Code generate multiple interpretations, or none at all. Forced to confront
these problems and to make interpretive choices, French jurists have produced
another mode of reading to guide and rationalize judicial decisions. This
Article demonstrates that this mode of reading calls for the French judge to
interpret the Code in terms of sociopolitical theories that are extrinsic to the
Code's grammar. These sociopolitical theories attempt to explain and justify
why the Code should be interpreted to mean something in a given situation.
This mode of reading represents an interpretive ideology that seeks to generate
meaning through hermeneutics.5
Because the sociopolitical theories used in the unofficial, hermeneutic
mode of reading are all external to the grammar of the Code, they offer a
portrait of the French judicial role that differs from the one implicit in the
Code. This result is hardly surprising: The theories exist in response to the
perceived interpretive limitations of the Code's grammatical method. What is
remarkable, however, is the extent of the disjunction between the official and
unofficial portraits. Examples of this disjunction surface periodically in French
casebooks or law reports, when a given judicial decision is followed by a
rather brief academic analysis, and especially on those rare occasions when a
decision follows the published argument of a judicial magistrat.6 In such
cases, the formal and grammatical discourse offered by the official judicial
decision is juxtaposed with the interpretive policy discourse offered by the
unofficial legal argument or academic analysis.
Because the unofficial discourse of the French judiciary has never been
presented before, this Article analyzes it in detail. This analysis reveals that the
French legal system simultaneously maintains two different conceptions of the
role of the civil judge-two different portraits or two different interpretive
5. See DE MAN, THE RESISTANCE TO THEORY, supra note 3, at 56-57 ("Hermeneutics is, by definition,
a process directed toward the determination of meaning; it postulates a transcendental function of
understanding, no matter how complex, deferred, or tenuous it might be, and will, in however mediated
a way, have to raise questions about the extralinguistic truth[-]value of literary texts."). Hermencutic reading
seeks to produce the meaning of a text by interpreting it in terms of some historical, political, social,
economic, religious, or other theory.
In his model analysis of the "rules of courtesy," Dworkin describes hermeneutic approaches, which
he calls "the 'interpretive' attitude," as possessing two components. See DWORKIN, supra note 3. at 47.
The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has
value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle-in short, that it has
some point--that can be stated independently of just describing the rules that make up the
practice. The second is the further assumption that the requirements of courtesy [are]..
sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or
modified or qualified or limited by that point. Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, the
institution of courtesy ceases to be mechanical .... People now try to impose meaning on the
institution ... and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning.
Id.
6. The term magistrat comprises all French judges, including Justices of the Cour de ceassation (the
French Supreme Court in private law matters), as well as the advocates general, who are attached to the
civil courts and who present arguments in an amicus curiae capacity. See infra note 48 and text
accompanying notes 131-37.
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ideologies. This Article pays particular attention to the relationship between the
official (grammatical) and unofficial (hermeneutic) judicial portraits. On the
one hand, the grammar of the official portrait constrains the possible unofficial
hermeneutics; the unofficial, theoretical understanding of the legal system must
somehow conform to the requirements of the Civil Code. On the other hand,
the unofficial hermeneutic is not-by definition-the grammar of the official
portrait. This hermeneutic diverges from, and appears in important respects to
contradict, the grammar of the Code. This Article examines how and why
these two portraits or interpretive ideologies exist simultaneously in the same
legal system, as well as what interpretive, discursive, and rhetorical effects this
coexistence produces.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part H presents the finest of the
traditional common law analyses of the French civil judicial system: John
Dawson's The Oracles of the Law. Part III describes the elements of the
French legal system that have been the traditional focus of comparative
analysis, and that compose the official portrait of the French civil judge. Part
IV reveals and explores those facets of the French legal system that have
escaped systematic comparative analysis, and that form the unofficial portrait
of the French civil judge; in particular, the internal and unofficial discourse of
the French magistrat. Part V analyzes the relationship between the official and
unofficial portraits. Part VI presents conclusions.
1[. THE AMERICAN FRAME: JOHN DAWSON'S THE ORACLES OF THE LAW
The Oracles of the Law presents by far the most erudite and insightful
American analysis of the French civil judicial system.7 Written in American
legal realism's pragmatic tradition,' it presents the French judicial system as
7. American comparative analysis of the French civil legal system has been dormant for over 25 years
John H. Merryman offers the only other significant American analysis. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN., THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 40, 44 (1969). Merryman terms the rigid French conception of adjudication "civil
law fundamentalis[m]" or the French "folklore of judicial interpretation." Although suggestive. Merryman's
analysis is extremely vague. This vagueness is primarily due to two factors. First. Merryman describes a
civil law "tradition" common to all of continental Europe and Latin America. and thereby intentionally
blurs the distinctions between the legal "systems" of particular civil law countries. Id. at 1-6. It is often
quite difficult to tell, therefore, when Merryman is speaking about the French (as opposed to the German.
Italian, or Argentinean) legal system. Second, Merryman intended his book to be an introductory text
"designed," as the preface states, "for the general reader." Thus, Merryman's text does not contain a single
footnote or endnote reference, and instead offers a brief list of recommended readings for the legal systems
of all of continental Europe and Latin America. Id. at 163-65.
This Article will focus on Dawson's text for the simple reason that no other significant analysts of
the French civil judicial system exists. Whatever attention common law academics have given the French
legal system has focused on the growing importance of the French Constitutional Council. a reflection of
the fascination of common law academics with the problem of judicial review. For the most thorough and
interesting analyses of the French Constitutional Council. see JOHN BEL.L FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1992); ALEC STONE, THE BIRH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUCIL IN
COMPARATVE PERSPECTIVE (1992).
8. The great majority of Dawson's theoretical allusions are to the legal realist Karl Uewellyn See. e.g..
DAWSON, supra note 2, at xiv-xv, 455-56, 484.
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the American system's formalist other. Dawson proposes that the French
system functions on a rigid theory of adjudication that hampers the adoption
of the case-law method's pragmatic techniques.9
According to Dawson, if England's long-standing, rigid theory of
adjudication bars appellate judges from overturning their own established
precedents, 0 the French theoretical rigidity bars judges from establishing
precedents in the first place. Noting that "[in the opinions of the [Cour de
cassation] what is mostly missing is any reference whatever to prior decisions,
either its own prior decisions or those of any other court,"" Dawson remarks
that "[t]he central conviction, which still lies deep, is that judges cannot be
lawmakers."' 2
Dawson traces the historical roots of this fundamental principle that judges
cannot make law.'3 "[M]odern French theories as to the role of judges are...
a reaction against the excessive power and pretensions of the French judiciary
under the old regime."' 4 Under the ancien r6gime, the French judiciary
wielded extraordinary power. The Parlements, or regional high courts,
possessed the authority not only to judge cases, but also to promulgate
regulations, known as arr~ts de r~glement, applicable in the territory of their
jurisdiction. 5 Moreover, the Parlements possessed the power to protest and
suspend-and even claimed the power to veto-royal acts by refusing to
register them in the Parlements' official books.
16
The contemporary French conception of the role of the civil judge was,
according to Dawson, determined by "a revolution in which the judiciary was
conceived as an enemy. Its survival to the present time must be partly
explained by the fact that this specter has continued to haunt many fearful
minds."' 7  The primary French reaction to judicial power was the
establishment of a rigid separation of governmental powers, and "distrust of
9. See icL at 415-16.
10. Id. at 413.
11. Id. at 407.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Merryman does so as well, speaking of the "attitudes that led France to adopt the metric system,
decimal currency, legal codes, and a rigid theory of sources of law, all in the space of a few years."
MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 26.
14. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 263.
15. Id. at 305-14; see also MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 17, 37 (discussing lack of separation of
powers under ancien rdgime).
16. See FELIX AUBERT, HISTOIRE DU PARLEMENT DE PARIS DE L'ORIGINE A FRANCOIS IER
(1250-1515) (Paris, A. Picard et fils 1894); FELIX AUBERT, LE PARLEMENT DE PARIS PHILIPPE LE BELA
CHARLES VII (1314-1422) (Paris, A. Picard 1890); DAWSON, supra note 2, at 305-14, 362-73.
In the waning years of the French monarchy, the Parlements, composed of entrenched nobility of the
robe, refused to register royal legislation intended to promote moderate reform and to salvage the
monarchy. "[T]hey foreclosed all hope of moderate reform, ensured that the wave would engulf them all,
and earned for themselves a nation's wrath." Id. at 373.
17. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 375. Merryman speaks of French "civil law fundamentalist[s]." whose
"utopian," "revolutionary" ideology sought to render law "judge-proof." MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 19,
40, 50.
1330 [Vol. 104: 1325
Judicial Portraits
the judiciary played as large a part as the dictates of Montesquieu's logic in
producing this strict separation."'" The supremacy of the legislature was the
fundamental assumption of France's post-Revolution political system. "Law-
making was not for the judiciary or executive; it was entirely reserved for the
legislature. From this monopoly of the law-making function it seemed to
follow that the only worthy subject of the interpreter's attention was code or
statute, duly invested with the legislator's sanction."' 9
The French conception of the judicial role therefore relegates the judge to
the secondary function of applying legislative provisions. The nineteenth-
century School of Exegesis offered the most elaborate version of this theory:
[Its] first assumption was of course that the legislature possessed a
monopoly of lawmaking power. The second assumption, not a
necessary consequence of the first, was that the legislature had
achieved complete coverage. This meant that for every problem there
was a governing rule to be found in code or statute. The third
assumption was that the whole body of legislation was internally
consistent.20
These assumptions, which are still "accepted by most authors though with
variations of degree,' form the basis of the French conception of the judicial
role.
Dawson objects to all three assumptions, arguing that codes alone cannot
produce order,22 especially given "a changed and changing society" and "a
Code that is now 160 years old though in its own basic provisions remarkably
unchanged."2 The net result of the rigid French theory of adjudication,
according to Dawson, has been to force the French judge formally to adhere
to its requirements while surreptitiously engaging in lawmaking. ' Thus, since
the 1790's, court decisions have "remained as laconic as before and sought to
make it appear that the court in fact had had no choice,"' 5 when in fact "the
range of choice is enormously wide."26 As Dawson categorically states, "In
discussing this topic it seems best to start with a simple affirmation: France
18. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 376; see also MERRYMAN. supra note 7. at 19. 23.
19. DAWSON, supra note 2. at 392.
20. Id at 393; see also MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 30 ("But if the legtslature alone could make laws
and the judiciary could only apply them ... such legislation had to be complete, coherent, and clear").
21. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 393.
22. See id. at 415 ("If one will grant, as some might not. that order is desirable and that codes alone
cannot produce it .... ); see also MERRYMAN. supra note 7. at 89 ("Although the legislature tres to
provide a clear, systematic legislative response for every problem that may aise, legtslative practice falls
far short of this objective. As a result, judges have a lot of interpreting to do.").
23. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 401-02; see also MERRYMAN. supra note 7. at 44 (-Although the text
of a statute remains unchanged, its meaning and application often change in response to social pressures,
and new problems arise that are not even touched on by any existing legislation.").
24. See DAWSON, supra note 2, at 400-01.
25. 1& at 382.
26. Id. at 409.
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has acquired case law in massive quantities. 27 Because of the requirements
of the rigid French conception of adjudication, however, the French judiciary
carefully masks this reality. From this observation, Dawson arrives at the
following insightful conclusion:
The stereotyped style of modem [French judicial] opinions is a
survival from a time that is now remote but that has not been
forgotten. I suggest that the ideas that inspired the style have also
survived, that the principal function of a high court opinion is to
demonstrate to the world at large that the high court in exercising its
exceptional powers has arrogated nothing to itself and is merely
enforcing the law .... And so the format of the 1790's continues
unchanged. The majestic parade of whereas clauses is cast as an
exercise in logic, working down inevitably from some provision of
Code or statute. It is the law that speaks. The judges are merely its
instrument, though by now the whole process could be better
described as extremely expert ventriloquism.28
In the French judicial opinion, the judiciary appears to adhere to the passive
and instrumental function required by the rigid French conception of
adjudication. Given interpretive, historical, and social realities, however, it is
the judge who surreptitiously controls.29
This insight leads to what might be termed "Dawson's paradox." In the
wake of the Revolution, the French attempted to limit judicial power by
enforcing a strict separation of powers that asserted absolute legislative
supremacy and categorically denied the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking. This
approach required an untenable conception of adjudication premised on simple
judicial application of preexisting Code or statute provisions. This
conception-which is still dominant-has led, paradoxically, to greater judicial
power. French judicial discretion is exercised under the guise of the mere
application of Code or statute. Supposedly forbidden to make law in the first
place, the French judge is under no pressure to rationalize and justify decisions
in any significant sense. He is left entirely to his own devices. Dawson
concludes: "A principle directed toward restraining judicial power thus serves
to enlarge it."
30
27. Id. at 400; see also MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 151 ("All know that much of the law actually
in force is found in the reports of judicial decisions, not in the Code Napoleon.").
28. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 410-11.
29. Even though formal respect is paid to the provisions of the code, the fiction that
these provisions actually offer solutions to the problems that come before the courts
has been wom thin by more than a century and a half of creative judicial
lawmaking....
* .* In France much of the power of the old code to impede social and
economic progress has been reduced by a creative judiciary.
MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 151.
30. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 431.
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To Dawson, the proper question is not whether judges possess the power
to make law, but how that power should be exercised. He advocates the
explicit adoption of case-law techniques, which would permit and require a
"reasoned elaboration," by judges, of the grounds for their decisions. These
grounds would carry a commitment: They would guide and constrain the
judiciary in its necessary role as mediator between the old and the new,
between the law as previously applied and the law as it must be created for the
future. "For these [case-law] techniques, administered by expert judges with
candor, have the purpose of enlisting them in a common enterprise-that of
maintaining continuity, coherence, and order in the inevitable process of new
creation.'
Dawson argues that French judges, who do not and cannot speak candidly
about what they do, use a cryptic style of expression that does not permit the
adoption of a reasoned and effective case-law method. 2 French judges,
Dawson duly notes, do not decide cases in a "random" fashion;3 3 but they
"have no responsibility for shaping, restating and ordering the doctrine that
they themselves produce."' The damaging effects are twofold. First, the legal
system is deprived of a "key" method of ordering the law developed and
created by its judges.35 Second, French judges operate individually, entirely
unaccountable to, and uncontrolled by, '[a]n effective case-law technique
[that,] employed by judges through the medium of the reasoned opinion, with
the responsibilities that it should entail, has the purpose and should have the
effect of limiting the powers of judges."36 Dawson therefore concludes his
analysis of French law with the following image: "Behind the cascades of
whereas clauses one can still see stalking the ghostly magistrats of the
Parlements, majestic in their moldy red robes.""
Dawson thus presents the French legal system as fatally hampered by its
formalist conception of adjudication. Dawson explains that French academics
and magistrats are aware of the creative and normative role actually exercised
by the French judiciary. But he claims that their adherence to the formalist
conception has precluded the effective and pragmatic use of the French
judiciary's case law.
31. Id.; see also id. at 375 ("ITIhe notion that judges could not make law offered a justification for
ignoring the heavy case-law gloss that courts had already laid on the codes. The denial of their law-making
power thus had the effect, strangely enough, of leaving the courts more free.-). td at 431 ("The judges
joined in this disclaimer and expressed it through a cryptic style of opinion writing shosc main purposc
was to prove their dutiful submission but which left them in fact more free.")
32. Id. at 416 ("Courts have been deterred from reasoned elaboration of their own grounds for decision
by their cryptic and formalized modes of expression.").
33. Id. at 409-10 ("[Tlhe results reached in particular cases usually become intelligible when matched
with the results of other cases .... [Olne usually discovers continuity in patterns of action, realism, and
practicality in the solutions reached.").
34. Id. at 415.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 431.
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This Article demonstrates that Dawson overestimates the predominance of
the formalist conception of adjudication, resulting in a skewed account of how
the French legal system actually operates. The formalist conception, which I
call the "official French portrait" of the civil judge and of the judicial role, has
long been critiqued by French magistrats and legal academics. This Article
shows how the French legal system has in fact internalized these critiques: It
has responded to them in both academic theory and judicial practice; and it has
done so in a discursive sphere constructed within the French judicial system.
In. THE OFFICIAL FRENCH PORTRAIT OF THE CIVIL JUDGE
The official French portrait of the civil judge represents an image of the
judge in the performance of his or her proper role. Officially, the civil judge
mechanically applies legislative provisions to given fact situations.3" It is the
statutory law-especially the Civil Code-that determines cases. Its matrix
generates outcomes in a grammatical fashion. This grammatical interpretive
ideology is the product of several constitutive elements. Legislative provisions
define the place of the judiciary in the French system of separation of powers
and delineate basic rules concerning the proper execution of the judicial role.
Judicial application and interpretation of these legislative provisions establish
and enforce a specific reading of these provisions. Finally, the formal structure
of the French civil judicial decision conveys a specifically grammatical
conception of the judicial role implicit in the very production of such
decisions.
This Part lays out the primary constitutive elements of the official portrait
of the civil judge: legislative rules, judicial interpretation and application of
these rules, and the form of the French judicial decision.
A. Legislative Rules
A small core of fundamental rules forms the statutory basis of the official
French portrait of the civil judge. Most of these rules were passed in the early
days of the French Revolution, and in the Civil Code, promulgated under
Napoleon in 1804. They define the parameters of the judicial role within the
traditional French conception of the separation of powers.
The five fundamental legislative rules state the following:
38. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 37-38 ("The picture of the judicial process that emerges is one
of fairly routine activity. The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk.... The net image is of the judge as
an operator of a machine designed and built by legislators. His function is a mechanical one."). See
generally Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1980); Michael H. Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction,
the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1986).
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1. "The courts may not directly or indirectly take any part in the exercise
of the legislative power, nor prevent or suspend the execution of the
decrees of the Legislative Branch ... under pain of forfeiture. '
2. "Judicial functions are distinct and will always remain separate from
the administrative [executive] functions. Judges may not, under pain
of forfeiture, disturb, in any way whatever, the operations of the
administrative [executive] bodies .... "40
3. "It is forbidden for judges to make pronouncements [to rule] by means
of general and regulatory provisions on the cases submitted to
them.
41
4. "The authority of the matter adjudged only relates to that which has
been the object of the judgment. The petition must be the same; it
must be founded on the same cause; it must be between the same
parties, and formulated by and against them in their same
capacities.
5. "The judge who refuses to judge, under pretext of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law, will be subject to prosecution for
denial of justice.'
' 3
The first two of these provisions, enacted as part of the Law on Judicial
Organization, establish and enforce the separation of powers.' These
provisions also strike at specific judicial prerogatives that existed prior to the
Revolution. In particular, they forbid the old Parlements' practice of passing
regulations, as well as the suspension (and possible veto) of legislation by the
Parlements' refusal to record it in the courts' official registers.
The latter three provisions are drawn from the Civil Code; they further
define the judicial role within the general parameters of the judicial power
established by the Law on Judicial Organization. The first of these provisions,
Article 5, forbids judicial lawmaking by explicitly proscribing two possible
modes of judicial pronouncements in court decisions. The prohibition against
"general ... provisions" proscribes the judicial creation of self-imposed
general or iterable rules. The provision against "regulatory provisions" strikes
explicitly at the pre-Revolution judicial practice of establishing formal
regulations (arr~ts de riglement).5 Article 5 therefore prohibits judges from
establishing any rule capable of application in later cases. In short, the
judiciary is denied normative power.
39. Code de l'organisation judiciare tit. II, art. 10. Aug. 16-24. 1790 [hereinafter The Law on Judicial
Organization].
40. Id. art. 13.
41. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 5.
42. Id. art. 1351.
43. Id. art. 4.
44. For a thorough discussion of the French separation of powers, see Burt Ncubomc. Judicial Review
and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. RE' 363 (1982)
45. See supra text accompanying note 15.
1995] 1335
The Yale Law Journal
Article 1351, the second of these provisions, represents the technical
apparatus by which the Article 5 prohibitions are put into effect. No judicial
decision can exert authority over another controversy unless there is
equivalence in thing sued for, as well as identity of cause, parties, and quality
of the parties. Articles 5 and 1351 require the individual treatment of cases.46
Article 4, the last provision, requires judges to adjudicate all cases. This
provision can readily sustain widely divergent-even contradictory-readings.
One interpretation is that there are no silences, obscurities, or insufficiencies
in the law, and that any judge who refuses to rule on such grounds therefore
does so on a mere pretext. Another interpretation is that such silences,
obscurities, and insufficiencies actually do exist, but that judges must rule
nonetheless. The grammar of the Code offers little help in resolving this
interpretive ambiguity.47
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Legislative Rules
The leading French judicial case on the proper (or improper) role of the
civil judge is a damage award case, decided by the Cour de cassation in
1955.48 The trial court held Mr. Fouchereau partially liable for the injuries
caused to Mr. Comet in an accident, and ordered monetary reparations. The
appellate court, without questioning the extent of Comet's injuries or the
responsibility of Fouchereau, nonetheless lowered the amount of reparations
owed to Comet. The appellate court stated as follows:
"[T]hat without contesting the fall in Comet's income after the
accident nor underestimating the personal extent of his productive
activity and the effect of his permanent partial disability on this
activity, the court believes itself unable to go beyond its usual
maximum assessment in such matters, and that there is good reason
to evaluate at 2,500,000 francs the compensation related to this
disability.
49
46. On its face, Article 1351 states nothing more than the doctrine of res judicata. It is included in this
Section as a provision that is fundamental to the French judicial role because the doctrine has been
interpreted somewhat differently in France than it has been in common law countries. See lnfra text
accompanying note 61.
47. Note that the very provision addressing ambiguity is itself ambiguous.
48. See Judgment of Nov. 3, 1955, Cass. crim., 1956 Recucil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 1 557. This decision was
actually rendered by a section of the criminal chamber. The French legal system permits criminal courts
to rule on the civil reparations owed to the victim of a crime.
The Cour de cassation is the highest court in the French civil law hierarchy. It is composed of
approximately 100 Justices. The Cour is divided into six "chambers." One handles criminal cases, and five
handle private law cases (cases involving civil law per se, commercial law, social security law, etc.). See
ROGER PERROT, INSTITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES 206-07 (3d ed. 1989). The civil chambers of the Cour handled
some 18,049 cases in 1992. See 1992 RAPPORT DE LA COUR DE CASSATION app. tbl. A.I (1993)
[hereinafter ANN. REP.].
49. Judgment of Nov. 3, 1955, 1956 D. Jur. I at 557 (quoting Judgment of Dec. 10, 1953, Cour
d'appel de Poitiers).
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The Cour de cassation quashed the appellate court's decision, reasoning that
the appellate court modified the lower court's decision
on the sole ground that "the court believes itself unable to go beyond
its usual maximum assessment in such matters," although, judges
being unable to pronounce by way of general and regulatory
disposition on the claims that are submitted to them and the defining
characteristic of damages being to repair entirely the prejudice, the
court .. could not limit compensation for a prejudice, the extent of
which it recognized, by claiming itself bound by "its usual maximum
assessment in such matters," and thus, at the least, by so ruling, by
reference to "its usual maximum assessment in such matters," the
challenged decision . . . did not give a legal basis for its
decision ... ; but whereas it is forbidden for judges to pronounce by
way of general and regulatory disposition on the claims submitted to
them; whereas if, in matters of damages resulting from a crime or
misdemeanor, [solely the lower court judges are empowered to
determine] ... the due reparations, they may not refer, in particular
cases, to rules established in advance to justify their decision;
whereas, there was, consequently, a violation of the texts alluded to
in the claim;
On these grounds, quash[] .... 50
In this opinion, the Cour de cassation quashes an appellate court decision
that had justified lowering a trial court's damage award on the sole basis that
it exceeded the amount usually awarded in such cases. The Cour's fundamental
problem is that the appellate court "'believes itself unable to go beyond its
usual maximum assessment in such matters."' 5' Deference by a court to its
own "usual maximum assessment in such matters" posits the existence and
application, in violation of Article 5 of the Civil Code, of a predetermined
judicial rule on how to calculate damages. According to the Cour de cassation,
however, the statement is problematic for other reasons as well. The problem
is not only that the judiciary has exercised legislative power by establishing a
rule, but also that it has not properly exercised its judicial power: Civil courts
cannot bind themselves with preestablished rules of their own making.
Can a civil court, then, make any reference at all to past judicial decisions?
The short answer is yes. As a practical matter, however, they rarely do, if only
because the Cour de cassation has established a series of rules limiting how
they may make such references. Courts are forbidden, as we have just seen, to
refer to their past cases as the sole basis for their decisions.52 Similarly,
courts may not rule based on the mere application of principles posited in a
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See also Judgment of Feb. 27, 1991, Cass. soc.. 1991 Bull. Civ V. No. 102: Judgmcnt of Mar
27, 1991, Cass. civ., 1991 Bull. Civ. III, No. 101.
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previous case.53 For instance, a French appellate court decision was quashed
for stating "'that there is occasion to apply to this case the principles already
posited in the Lafeuille decision."'4 The Cour de cassation ruled that "a mere
reference by the judge to principles posited in a preceding decision rendered
between different parties" did not constitute appropriate legal grounds for a
judicial decision.55
Another appellate decision was quashed for finding it unnecessary to state
facts that had already been discussed in previous cases, and for stating that
"the Court is conforming expressly to its jurisprudence on this issue as
established by several judgments rendered on April 4th, 1892... [and] in
referring to its jurisprudence, the Court must declare this appeal inadmissible
or at the very least unfounded. 56 Stating that "a judgment must be self-
sufficient," the Cour de cassation found that the appellate decision, which
"does not explain itself either on the facts to which it refers, nor on the so-
called jurisprudence," had no legal basis because "what is missing .... from
the denounced judgment cannot be filled in by what is in other judgments
rendered in similar cases."57 Of particular interest, beyond the substantive
holding of the case, is the Cour de cassation's transparent annoyance: It objects
to the appellate court's reference to its "so-called jurisprudence."58 The Cour
is unwilling to grant that such a jurisprudence could exist in the first place.
The issue then becomes how the French define the ambiguous term
'Jurisprudence." In French legal terminology, jurisprudence may mean a
court's (1) past decisions, (2) precedents, or (3) judicial doctrine on a
particular legal issue. When the term simply means past court decisions,
judicial reference to such decisions is considered acceptable. Cour de cassation
decisions have permitted such judicial reference, i.e., mere citation, to
jurisprudence (in the limited sense of past court decisions). But when the term
also encompasses the notion of consistent judicial doctrine, then the separation-
of-powers problems recur. The official French judicial portrait, as produced by
substantive legal decisions, denies the viability of consistent and judicially
created doctrine.
53. See Judgment of Feb. 4, 1970, Cass. crim., 1970 Recucil Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] 333. An interesting
and increasingly important exception is the judicial elaboration of "general principles of law," which must
be disclosed by a court if they form the basis of a decision. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. I, 1881, Cass. rcq.,
1882 Recueil P6riodique et critique [D.P.] I 113. For a discussion of these general principles of law, see
Richard J. Cummins, The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial
Decision in France, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 594 (1986).
54. Judgment of June 6, 1894, Cass. req., 1894 D.P. I 336, 336 (quoting Judgment of Nov. 3, 1891,
Cour d'appel de Limoges).
55. Id.
56. Judgment of Nov. 20, 1895, Cass. req., 1896 D.P. 1 326, 326; see also Judgment of July 24, 1967,
Cass. crim., 1967 Recueil Sirey [J.C.P.] II, No. 68 (vacating decision that rested solely on lower court's
jurisprudence).
57. Judgment of Nov. 20, 1895, 1896 D.P. I at 327.
58. Id.
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The Cour de cassation has therefore determined that a judge can refer to
jurisprudence as long as such a reference does not constitute "the
determinative argument of his decision. ' 9 For this reason, appellate judges
cannot even refer to jurisprudence of the Cour as the legal basis for
overturning a decision, nor will the Cour sustain appeals on the basis of a
lower court's violation of the Cour's own jurisprudence. The Cour will not
even entertain such an appeal. 60 The substantive rules produced by the French
judiciary turn on the distinction between what is (and what is not) considered
determinative or authoritative in judicial decisions-i.e., the distinction
between legislation and jurisprudence.
The interpretation of Article 1351 of the Civil Code also plays an essential
role in the judicial contribution to the official French portrait of the civil judge.
Article 1351 appears to be nothing more than the doctrine of res judicata;
nonetheless, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Code and with the assorted
statutes concerning the "motivation" of decisions, it has been judicially
construed to produce results particular to the French legal system.
The Cour de cassation has interpreted Article 1351 to mean that res
judicata can apply only to the actual holding of a particular case.6 The
judicial reasoning underlying the judgment, however, cannot exert "the
authority of a matter adjudged. 62 While the substance of a decision is thus
transposable in certain limited situations, the judicial reasoning is not. The only
exception is the reasoning that is the necessary support of the judgment. 63 Of
course, even this reasoning can only be transposed to cases satisfying the
requirements of Article 1351-that is, cases involving, inter alia, identical
parties. What this means, as a practical matter, is that judicial reasoning from
one decision can never determine the outcome of an unrelated case. According
to the judicial construction of the requirements of the Civil Code, this should
come as no surprise; if judicial reasoning from one case could determine the
judgment in another, this reasoning would constitute a judicial rule, thus
violating the Article 5 ban on "general and regulatory provisions." As the
French judiciary has interpreted the Code, Articles 5 and 1351 work in tandem,
the latter being the necessary corollary of the former.
59. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1958, Cass. crim.. 1958 Bull. Cnm.. No. 58. at 65
60. The Cour states, in the opening section of a tellingly dismissive decision, that it will not -pause
[to consider] the argument [concerning] the violation of judicial doctrine that cannot, of itself, give rise to
the quashing of a decision." Judgment of Dec. 21. 1891. Cass. req.. 1892 D.P. 1 543. 543 Such an appeal
is too ridiculous to be considered. Of course, had the appeal claimed that the appellate court had misapplied
or "violated" the statute in question, and if the Cour de cassation's junspndence did in fact run counter
to the interpretation produced by the appellate court, the Cour would not only have considered the appeal.
it would likely have quashed the appellate court's decision.
61. See, e.g., Judgment of May 14, 1991. Cass. com.. 1991 Bull. Cir. IV. No 160
62. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 5, 1991, Cass. civ. 2e. 1991 Bull. Ciy. I. No. 109, at 59
63. See, e.g., Judgment of June 13, 1966, Cass. civ. Ire. 1966 D.S. Jur 1 714; Judgment of Oct. 6.
1954, Cass. civ. Ire, 1955 Recueil Sirey (S. Jur.] I § 8458, No. 2; Judgment of Jan. 4. 1954. Cass. civ Ire,
1955 S. Jur. I § 8458, No. I Judgment of Feb. 21. 1900. Cass. civ. Ire. 1905 D.P. 1271.
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C. The Form and Structure of the French Judicial Decision
The form and structure of the French civil judicial decision represent the
final-and perhaps most important-elements of the official portrait. The form
and structure of French civil judicial opinions offer an image of what French
civil judges do, an interpretive ideology of how the judges have gone about
deciding the case in question.
All decisions of the Cour are composed in a single sentence structured in
the following manner:
The Court,
(a) Given [numerical citations of the legislative texts] .. .
Whereas ....
Whereas ....
(b) On these grounds, [holding]. 64
As Mimin explains in his authoritative treatise on the style of the French
judicial opinion: "Grammatically, a) and b) are part of a single sentence: in b)
are the verbs of the principal propositions, and in a) are the relative
propositions of these verbs. One must insist on a grammatical structure that
leads to necessary consequences."'65 This paradigmatic form has existed
unchanged since the Revolution. The basic structure of the French judicial
opinion was first established by the Law on Judicial Organization of 1790,
which states the following:
The drafting of judgments, on appeal as well as in the first instance,
shall contain four distinct parts-In the first, the names and qualities
of the parties will be stated-In the second, the questions of fact and
law that constitute the case will be formulated with precision-In the
third, the result of the facts recognized or noted by the instruction,
and the reasoning that will have determined the judgment, will be
expressed-The fourth will finally contain the ruling of the judgment.
A single example of the classic judicial opinion, quoted in full, will suffice to
demonstrate its basic form and structure:
(Bossoul C. Laffeuille et comp.)-decision
THE COURT;-On the first part of the second claim:-Given
Article 7 of the Law of Apr. 20, 1810;-Whereas, to do justice to the
appeal of Laffeuille & Co. and reject Bossoul's request for damages,
the challenged decision (Cour d'appel de Limoges, Nov. 3, 1891)
limits itself to declaring in its reasoning "that there is occasion to
apply to this case the principles already posited in the Lafeuille and
64. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 2, at 407.
65. PIERRE MIMIN, LE STYLE DES JUGEMENTS 187 (4th ed. 1962).
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Chaumeil v. Lachaud decision of the preceding October
24th;-Whereas the contractors were not held to assign entirely to the
insurance the deduction of 2% on the salary of its workers, and that
according to the terms of the policy, they owe the appellee only the
sum of 150 francs";-Whereas one could not legally find grounds for
a decision in a simple reference by the judge to principles posited in
a previous decision handed down between other parties;-Whereas
nor could one find them in affirmations that are but the consequence
of this reference;-Whereas, consequently, by ruling as it did, the
Cour d'appel de Limoges violated the legal provision cited
above;--On these grounds, and without it being necessary to rule on
the first claim of the appeal nor on the second part of the second
claim;--Quashes. 66
Several formal aspects of this decision are striking. To begin with, it is
remarkably brief. The decision is, after all, a decision of the highest civil court
in France. American common law jurists might have expected more.67 The
length of the quoted opinion is representative, however, of French Cour de
cassation decisions.68 Furthermore, the decision is structured logically and
grammatically according to the standard model delineated above.'
The formal, single-sentence structure of the French judicial decision resists
any discourse that might hamper its smooth grammatical flow. Any discussion
that would introduce uncertainty or debate into the text of the decision, thereby
tending to complicate the grammar of the sentence, conflicts with the very
structure of the decision. "Grammar alone would severely restrict any reasoned
discussion of past decisions."7 It is difficult to imagine attempts at inserting
contemporary policy discussion into a single sentence, especially one
grammatically structured in the traditional French mold. Serious discussion of
interpretive difficulties would be no less problematic. How might
countervailing policy interests or divergent legal interpretations be introduced?
By using the conjunction "but," yielding the phrase "but whereas"? Mimin
does address this possible phrase in his book, but in a section entitled "Words
without a function.'
The French judicial decision, in its paradigmatic form, possesses a
univocal quality that denies the possibility of alternative perspectives,
66. Judgment of June 6, 1894, Cass. req.. 1894 D.P. 1. 336. 336.
67. See DAWSON, supra note 2, at 411.
68. Mimin offers the following explanation: "Almost obhgatonly dry. the judicial style would soon
give the impression of being platitudinous. even inane, if one were to venture into overly deseloped
narration." MIMIN, supra note 65, at 208.
69. See supra text accompanying note 64; see also MIMIN. supra note 65. at 185 ("In France. judicial
decisions are cast in a familiar mold.").
70. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 407.
71. MIMIN, supra note 65, at 163-69. Nonetheless. the construction "but w.hereas" is not uncommon
in French court decisions. It usually marks the court's formal refutation of an argument made by one of
the parties. It is therefore used authoritatively, not as a means to express doubt or the existence of
conflicting possibilities.
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approaches, or outcomes. This univocal quality is further promoted by the
collegial style in which the decisions are rendered. The French judicial
decision is rendered by the entire court as a unit; individual judges do not sign
opinions. Dissenting and concurring opinions are forbidden.
The voice of the French judicial decision takes a particular form. The
grammatical structure of the decision requires that the decision be composed
in the third person singular. In the French judicial opinion, it is "The Court"
that speaks. The grammar therefore not only promotes a univocal judicial
statement, but also prevents the personalization of the statement; the signed
judicial "I" does not exist. The French judge is not personalized, and the
French judicial decision is not a matter of personal opinion.
The grammatical and structural form of the judicial decision portrays the
depersonalized judge as merely plugging applicable legislative provisions and
the bare minimum of relevant facts into the formal mold, mechanically
producing the judgment. The mechanics of the French judicial decision is that
of the "judicial syllogism": "In France, the decision is as short as possible, as
irrefutable as possible. Our ideal is the decision ten to fifteen lines long
constituting, if possible, a syllogism with a major [premise], a minor [premise],
and an unstoppable conclusion. 72 The given legislative provision constitutes
the major premise, the facts constitute the minor premise, and "the declaration
of what the statutory law commands regarding the controversy" forms the
conclusion.73 According to the structure of the civil judicial decision, it is
exclusively the statutory law that dictates the outcome of legal controversies.
This appearance of mechanical judicial application is further advanced by
another stylistic peculiarity of the French judicial decision: The legislative
enactments or Code provisions that form the basis of the decision are merely
cited by number.74 The legislative text itself rarely appears. The typical
French appellate judicial decision will therefore read: "The Court;-Given
Articles 47 and 1251 of the Civil Code; Whereas plaintiff did x; Whereas
defendant did y; Whereas the lower court ruled z;-On these grounds, rejects
the appeal." The Code provision is an absolute given that generates, almost
algebraically, the decision. When portions of the text of the given Code
provision do surface in the text of the decision, they are not set off by
quotation marks. There is no distance between the legislative text and the
judicial text. The statutory law speaks through the court.
72. Andr6 Tune, La Cour de cassation en crise, in 30 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROlT 157, 165
(Ren6 Sve ed., 1985).
73. EVELYNE SERVERIN, DE LA JURISPRUDENCE EN DROIT PRIV9 70 (1985) (quoting argument of Mr.
Garat the elder against the plans presented by Mr. Dupport and Mr. Sieyes to the Assemblde Nationale)
(citation omitted).
74. The Cour de cassation formally ruled on the legality of this canonical judicial practice in Judgment
of Aug. 2, 1875, Cass. req., 1876 D.P. I 260, 261.
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The French ci-vil judge, as portrayed by the very form of the judicial
decision, thus appears as a passive agent of the statutory law. Montesquieu
states, in a passage quoted by French legal academics for more than two
hundred years, that judges should be "the mouth that pronounces the words of
the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigor.""
The form and structure of the French judicial decision portray the civil judge
as just this kind of mechanical mouth; he does no more than apply legislative
provisions, leading to required outcomes already determined in the matrix of
statutory law. It is in this sense that the French civil judge has often been
described as a "syllogism machine.
' 76
IV. THE UNOFFICIAL FRENCH PORTRAIT OF THE CIVIL JUDGE
In the Article 5 case discussed above, the Cour de cassation quashed an
appellate decision lowering a damage award that exceeded the "usual
maximum assessment" in such matters." As published in the Recueil
Dalloz,7s the Cour's opinion is immediately followed by a case note authored
by one of France's most influential academics, Rend Savatier:
That there exists, in each jurisdiction, a sort of regular scale for
the calculation of damages, especially concerning the evaluation,
always difficult and somewhat elastic, of the consequences of an
injury, this is a well-known fact. Not only is this practice general, but
also beneficial. It is a limitation, based on experience, that the judge
places on his arbitrariness....
One can well understand the judge's private qualms expressed by
the quashed decision, qualms whose expression, however, earned him
the censure of the supreme Cour...
But one also understands perfectly well the blame of the Cour de
cassation in the face of this public revelation, made by the judge, of
the systematic method by which he had overcome his scruples.
But this method, somehow validated by the appellate decision,
and presented as the grounds justifying and determining the judgment,
was not easily reconciled with Article 5 of the Civil Code. ... '
This case note is a crack through which one can glimpse an entirely different
portrait of the French civil judge. Savatier readily acknowledges, and even
praises, the prevalence of systematic judicial rules that guide the calculation
of damages. It is not the violation of Article 5 per se that he is criticizing, but
75. 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU. TIHE SPIRIT OF THiE LAWs 163 (Anne N1.
Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748).
76. See, e.g., I JEAN CARBONNIER, DROlT CIVIL 18 (1967) ("ITIlhe judge is a man and not a syllogism
machine.").
77. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
78. The Recueil Dalloz is the French equivalent of the West Reports.
79. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1955, Cass. crim., 1956 D.P. 1 557. 557-58 note R. Savatcer.
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rather the public revelation of such judicial rules. Savatier's conception of the
role of the civil judge differs dramatically from the role presented by the
official French portrait.
This Part explores the "unofficial" portrait of the civil judge as it is
reflected in, and produced by, mainstream French academic theory
(doctrine)80 and the argumentation of judicial magistrats. This portrait
necessarily will be a composite of diverse conceptions of the civil judge.
Nonetheless, the great majority of these academic and judicial conceptions
share certain basic assumptions. The "unofficial" portrait presented here is
intended to represent a "greatest common denominator" conception of the
French civil judge, as understood by the French legal profession itself.
This Part demonstrates that there exists, within the French legal system, a
vibrant discursive sphere in which French magistrats and academics operate
on the assumption that the judicial role is quite different from that implicit in
the official portrait. In this unofficial discursive sphere, French academic
theory and judicial practice take into account, as a matter of course, most of
the kinds of critiques that Dawson levels at the French adjudicatory system.
A. Mainstream French Academic Doctrine
Mainstream French academic doctrine, which both reflects and informs
French legal consciousness, represents an important element of the unofficial
portrait of the judicial role. French legal scholars identify 1899, the year of
Frangois Gdny's first publication of Mithode d'interpritation,81 as the birth
of "modem" French legal consciousness.82 Gdny's book presented a scathing,
Realist-style critique of the mechanical and formalist judicial practice of his
day. Since Gdny, every major twentieth-century French analysis of the civil
legal system has worked from the following three assumptions: (1) the Codes
inevitably contain gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities inherent in the text itself and
produced by the evolution of modem society; (2) the perfectly formalist
conception of unproblematic, passive, and grammatical adjudication is therefore
no longer tenable; and (3) the judiciary has in fact played-if only by
necessity-a fundamental role in the establishment and development of legal
norms. This Section presents an overview of the primary concerns of the major
French academic theories of adjudication.
80. The French term doctrine traditionally refers to academic scholarship and legal commentary. It has
been generally left untranslated (and is italicized) in order to distinguish it from the common law notion
of "judicial doctrine." As will be explained, however, the term has begun to acquire interesting new
connotations. See infra part IV.C.4.
81. 1 GINY, supra note 4.
82. See, e.g., SERVERIN, supra note 73, at 145.
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1. The Critique
For the nearly one hundred years since G6ny first attacked "that fetishism
of the written and codified statutory law," which constituted "the most
distinctive and.., most salient trait" of nineteenth-century academic and
judicial practice,13 "modem" French doctrine has critiqued the rigid theory
of adjudication implicit in what I have been calling the official portrait of the
civil judge. The first target has been the notion of complete legislative
coverage, "that pretentious notion that, under the reign of modem codification,
wishes to find, simply in the dispositions of written law [legislation], all legal
solutions."'
According to French doctrine, two insurmountable hurdles render complete
legislative coverage impossible: human imperfection and the incessant
evolution of society over time. As G6ny states, "even if one could imagine...
a legislator sufficiently perspicacious to penetrate, with a far-ranging and
profound gaze, the whole of the legal order of his time, . . . he still would be
unable to foresee ... all future relations." 5 Modem French doctrine therefore
works under the assumption that legislation must inevitably contain gaps.'
The debunking of the myth of complete legislative coverage leads to a
critique of the mechanical and syllogistic means by which the "traditional"
French method of interpretation seeks to fill legislative gaps. As Gdny states:
"a) there are points requiring legal resolution that are not foreseen and settled
by the statutory law; b) logic remains powerless to fill all the gaps resulting
from the insufficiency of the texts."87 Despite this problem, notes the French
academic, the French judicial decision maintains its perfectly syllogistic form,
as if the Code were grammatically generating all legal solutions.
French doctrine almost universally concludes, therefore, that the traditional
form of the civil judicial decision masks important facets of judicial practice.
As Jean Carbonnier states:
83. 1 GftNY, supra note 4. at 70.
84. 1 id at 97.
85. 1 id. at 117.
86. See, e.g., SADOK BELAID, ESSAI SUR LE POUVOIR CR-ATEUR ET NOWNMATIF DU juGE 73-74 (1974)
(arguing that complete legislative coverage is a 'fiction"): Tunc. supra note 72. at 159 (arguing that
existing and future gaps in law must be filled).
87. 1 GtNY, supra note 4, at 195.
[I]t becomes totally unacceptable, when one starts from precepts emanating from an arbitrary
will (written legislation), to extend them beyond the conditions that they specify. The conditions
foreseen by the statutory law no longer being precisely in operation, the issue becomes whether
the same prescription should apply, or whether it is the occasion, on the contrary, to establish
another one. But when it comes time to choose between these two opposing procedures
(arguments by analogy or a contrario)-and such a choice is thrust upon us by all written
precepts as soon as one moves beyond their texts-logic is manifestly powerless: This Ichoicel
requires the consideration and estimation of moral, political, and economic factors that are
manifestly developed outside of the texts ...
I id at 198-99.
19951 1345
The Yale Law Journal
Quite often, contrary to the classic syllogism where they should
descend from the legal rule to the concrete decision, [judges] start by
positing the concrete decision that strikes them as humanly desirable,
and then endeavor to work back to a legal rule. Things must always
have happened this way since ... there have always been judges, and
judges who think.88
Given that legislative gaps exist, that logic cannot fill them, and that they are
nonetheless filled when cases are decided, it is the judge who must be filling
the gaps.
Modern French doctrine therefore takes it for granted that the judiciary
plays a significant role in the creation and development of legal norms.
Carbonnier, for example, states:
[Modern doctrine] accepts that the judge be a creator, and not just an
interpreter... That judgments, insofar as they imply judicially
constructed rules, must be seen as being part of the totality of the law,
is hardly contested today when it is commonly declared that law can
be judicial as well as legislative .... 89
French doctrine accepts the judiciary's creative normative role to such a degree
that mainstream academics such as Professor Tunc can state, without
explanation," that "as often happens today... [the Cour de cassation] truly
creates a rule of law." 91
2. The Justifications
Modern French doctrine has produced several theories designed to explain,
guide, and justify how and why the civil judiciary exercises creative normative
power when confronted with insufficiencies in the legislative code. The first
of these theories, advanced by G6ny, is "free scientific research."
88. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 35-36. In support of this proposition, Carbonnier cites Joseph
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q.
274 (1929). Similarly, Belaid claims that:
Interpretation can actually cover a work of pure creation .... Certainly, in the performance of
this task, it is traditional ... that the judge hide his creative work and the originality of his
contribution behind the mask of faithful interpretation and of strict observance of the will of the
legislator. But as G6ny said, one should not be duped by words or by appearances.
BELAID, supra note 86, at 80.
89. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 33-34.
90. Belaid does offer the following atypical explanation:
The obligation to judge founds the creative power of the judge-the obligation implies the
power .... In order that he may rule on all the conflicts that will be submitted to him and
correctly fulfill this obligation, it must implicitly be admitted that the judge disposes of the
proper means to perform his mission. The power to create legal rules is an implicit competence
of every judicial function.
BELAID, supra note 86, at 271.
91. Tunc, supra note 72, at 168.
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G6ny proposes free scientific research as an interpretive and creative
method that should be deployed by the judge on those occasions when gaps in
legislation have not been filled by custom.92 In such cases:
[T]he jurisconsult will have no choice but to scrutinize directly the
nature of things, and to question the social elements himself, from
which he must fix the rule .... Above all, he will have to measure
these objects [of investigation] like a legislator, determining their true
nature and the laws that harmonize them, keeping his eyes fixed on
the ideal of justice or social utility that must, before all else, be
satisfied.93
According to Grny, therefore, the task of the judge in such cases parallels that
of the legislator.94 The primary difference is that the judge must utilize a
method designed to "free himself, as much as possible, from all personal
influences," whereas the legislator's will knows no limits. Gdny's proposed
judicial method, free scientific research, seeks to base judicial decisions on
"objective elements" identified in "the nature of things," 5 which science
alone can reveal.96 The judge discerns these objective elements and the rules
of their "harmony" by drawing upon the social sciences, especially sociology,
psychology, political economics, and history (including the history of ideas).'
"[Tlhe sciences," writes Giny, "shed light on the goal of life and the means
to attain it."98 Individual judicial decisions, armed with this knowledge, would
merely seek to attain these practical goals: "[I]n each particular case, it would
only take ... research into the goal to extricate, from the goal itself, the rule
for the solution." 99 French doctrine has come to accept free scientific research
as a legitimate judicial practice. As Carbonnier explains, if "the preexisting
legal order" does not furnish "an adequate legal rule for the case,"" then the
judge may "forge" a rule "as if he were acting as a legislator""''
A second theory in favor of the creative power of the civil judge, advanced
most notably by Carbonnier, claims that the judge plays an important equity
92. Gny notes that only "sometimes the written law will be filled in and specified by custom"
2 G&NY, supra note 4, at 222 (emphasis added).
93. 2 id. at 222-23.
94. 2 id. at 223.
95. 2 id. at 82.
96. 2 id at 78 (footnotes omitted).
97. 2 Ud. at 137-40, 142, 144.
98. 2 id. at 144.
99. 2 id. at 90 (footnote omitted).
100. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 33.
101. 1 id. at 33-34. Carbonnier explicitly identifies this practice as "free scientific research-" Id- C.
BELAtD, supra note 86, at 278 ("[Elvery time a judge gives a precise meaning to a statute. he performs a
creative activity as important as that of the legislator who wrote the statute "): GtRARD TItsrr. LEs
FIGURES DU JUGEMENT (1993).
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function in the legal system.1°2 To Carbonnier, equity means "law freed of
rules, law that seeks a particular solution for each case, or better still, law that
seeks an individual solution for each person."'' 0 3 An equity judgment is thus
"a pure judgment that does not believe itself capable of becoming a rule. '""n
Such a judgment is "the solution to a litigation, the appeasement of a conflict:
to make peace rule between men is the supreme end of law."' 05 Carbonnier
explains that judges will exercise such equity powers even when the existing
legal rules do not grant them such power. Why? "Because the judge is a man
and not a syllogism machine: he judges by his intuition and his sensitivity as
much as he does by his knowledge of [legal] rules and by his logic."'"
Carbonnier recognizes that it is difficult for French judges to rule overtly in
equity, however justified they may be in doing so. Fortunately, they "know
how to cloak [their equity judgments] in a legal form" by declaring the
equitable solution to be the one syllogistically determined by statutory law. "
A final theory in favor of the creative power of the civil judge has been
most visibly championed by Tunc. This theory, which has its roots in free
scientific research, posits that the French judiciary, and especially the Cour de
cassation, must play an important role in the modernization of the law, in its
adaptation to the evolving needs produced by "the complex and ever-changing
movement of social life."' 08 Tunc states:
What seems clear to me is that, regarding this delicate task of
modernization of the law, there is room for action by both the
legislator and the judge, and that in fact, the tribunals and the Cour
de cassation accept to participate in this mission of modernization of
the law.'9
As this statement demonstrates, the Cour is already understood to be
performing this task deliberately. Furthermore, argues Tunc, the Cour should
modify its procedure in order to maximize this modernizing role. Tunc
suggests that a drastic reduction of its caseload would permit the Cour to
102. Cf BELAID, supra note 86, at 336-38 (in applying his "sense of equity," French judge
"humaniz[es] the rules of the positive law" on basis of fluid mandates of Natural Law).
103. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 34.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see BELAID, supra note 86, at 284 (asserting that primary role of judge is "peaceful settling
of conflicts").
106. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 18.
107. 1 id. at 18-19.
108. 1 G1NY, supra note 4, at 195. Tune argues that the Cour must
fill the existing gaps in the law and ... fill the future gaps in the law, that is to say, adapt it
to the needs and to the very aspirations of contemporary society. Such is, unquestionably, the
highest function of the Cour de cassation. It is questionable in terms of its constitutional basis,
but it is unquestionable in practice.
Tune, supra note 72, at 159; see also BELAID, supra note 86, at 303 (arguing that creative role of judges
promotes continuity, evolution, and progress in French legal system).
109. Tune, supra note 72, at 160.
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render more carefully considered decisions on the basis of such elements as the
spirit of the legislation in question, the existing jurisprudence on the issue, the
various theories proposed by academic doctrine, and the "social consequences"
of "a decision in one direction or the other."" 0 Tunc's underlying belief is
that the Cour "must in effect examine not a case, but a [legal] problem raised
on the occasion of a case."'.. Additionally, the Cour should alter the cryptic
and hermetic form of its syllogistic decisions. "2 Tunc states: "It seems
obvious to me that explicit motivation [of judicial decisions] would produce
the clarity necessary for framing questions in a way that facilitates progress,
dialogue with doctrine, and opening toward social reality.""' As a first step,
Tunc proposes dropping the traditionally "collegial" (univocal) judicial
decision. Such collegial decisions are "farther from reality," often "imposing
judicial compromises" that are "less clear" and "a source of ambiguity." They
make it unnecessary for French judges to present "solid argumentation." And
perhaps worst of all, they "do not open the door to an internal critique
favorable to progress," but instead suppress dissenting opinions that might
contain valuable "avant-garde ideas."" 4
As the work of G6ny, Carbonnier, and Tunc demonstrates, French doctrine
not only accepts the fact that the civil judiciary plays an important role in the
creation and development of legal norms, but also offers theories to justify the
judicial exercise of that role. The question nonetheless remains, to frame the
issue in traditional French terms, whether jurisprudence constitutes a "formal
source of law." Does the judge who fills in legislative gaps create law? What
is the normative force of a long, unbroken line of judicial precedents? In
response to such questions, G~ny advances his famous theory of the role and
status of jurisprudence in the French legal system:
110. Id. at 159-60.
111. Id. at 160.
112. In Trunc's words:
Where does the legal principle that the Cour announces in the major [premisel of its syllogism
come from? If it is a legislative text, it is surprising that the issue has reached the Cour dc
cassation. Normally, the Cour posits or repeats a principle of jurisprudence of its own creation.
Why had it posited this principle? One has no idea. Sometimes [the Cour] engages in the
overturning of jurisprudence. It affirms the contrary of what it had theretofore affirmed. Why"
One isn't any more in the know, or in any case, the Cour does not explain it to any greater
extent. And sometimes, the maintenance of a principle camouflages a change in how it is
applied. That is an unavowed overturning.
Id. at 165.
113. Id. at 166. Compare Gny's claim:
By substituting notions that are technical, abstract, cold. and devoid of fertile reality for the
truly substantial elements of the life of the law, that is. the moral, psychological, economic.
political, and social motives that animate the legal world, our interpretation has made itself a
system constructed entirely of ready-made phrases and pure categories; and, combined with the
excessive influence attributed to modem codification, this system has rendered scientific
jurisprudence not only sterile, but often irreparably rebellious to progress.
I GNY, supra note 4, at 149.
114. Tunc, supra note 72, at 168.
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[I]f jurisprudence does not possess, in and of itself, the value of a
formal source of law, it often contributes to the formation of such
sources, and even constitutes, in actuality, an essential and
indispensable element of those sources....
Above all else .... jurisprudence is, for us, in the modern era, the
only truly fertile-and in any case the most frequent-opportunity for
legal custom, principally general custom. Indeed, once established on
a given point, jurisprudence, because of its indisputable authority, at
least in fact .... frequently plays a determinative role .... [When
jurisprudence entrenches itself], it satisfies all the elements of a true
legal custom, of which the jurisprudence represents the departure
point and the essential determinant.... I do not see... how we can
refuse to recognize in it a truly obligatory rule of law, as the issue of
that formal source: custom.-But it is important to note: It is not that
jurisprudence constitutes an independent source of law, any more than
it constitutes a custom sui generis. It only emerges, under these
hypotheses, as the propulsion device of custom, but a propulsion
device so indispensable, and of such inevitable effects, in our social
and political condition, that a transposition of ideas-or maybe only
a linguistic simplification-would suffice to bring to it all the credit
for the creation, of which it constitutes, in fact, the cardinal
instrument....
That is how jurisprudence, as the initiator of custom, can, in my
opinion, still to this day, be thought of as a force truly productive of
law. 115
In Gdny's scheme, judicial precedents do not qualify as an independent source
of law. Precedents merely have "authority" (an expression that Gdny hardly
defines in the clearest of terms), which can contribute to the creation of
custom.
Gdny's classification of jurisprudence as mere "authority," and his refusal
to accord it the exalted status of a "source of the law," continues to be the
predominant position of French doctrine."6 Thus Carbonnier, while he
defines jurisprudence as "the solution generally given by the courts to a
question of law"'" 7 or as the "habit of the courts,"" 8 and while he believes
that it is formed out of "what is most abstract [in judgments], having general
value for other possible cases," ' 19 flatly states that 'jurisprudence is not a
source of law. It is but an opinion that tends to become law. It possesses, as
such, a certain authority, but more or less depending on the
circumstances."' 20 The key is that jurisprudence does not "directly" yield
115. 2 G.NY, supra note 4, at 50-52.
116. But see, e.g., BELAID, supra note 86, at 67, 296-301 (arguing that jurisprudence is part of
positive law, in strictest sense of term).
117. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 242.
118. 1 id at 243.
119. Id.
120. 1 id, at 244.
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"obligatory legal rules." Thus, "one can conjecture that, in the future, a court,
confronted with the same [legal] question, will judge it in the same fashion:
it is not obliged-legally-to do so, but it is a probability."'' As Carbonnier
states, jurisprudence is an authority "de facto and not de jure, moral and not
juridical."' 2 The reasoning is simple: Although the courts may, in fact,
almost always follow their jurisprudence, they are not legally required to do
so.
3. The Resulting Tension
"Modem" mainstream French academics agree that the traditional image
of the passive French judge, mechanically applying legal provisions through
the judicial syllogism's deductive method, can no longer be maintained. They
believe that the French legal codes do not constitute a perfect generative
grammar; and they challenge the traditional French myth of total legislative
coverage. Since G6ny, it has been generally conceded that the Code must
contain gaps that cannot be filled by the merely mechanical extension of
existing legislation. Instead, the judge can rectify these failures of the legal
code only by drawing upon sources extrinsic to the Code.
As Carbonnier states, Gdny's proposed method of "free scientific research"
has become contemporary French academic doctrine's primary means of
introducing elements external to the Code. But what are the external elements
that are added to the grammatical orientation of the French judicial system?
Contemporary French legal academics tend to answer that "modem" academic
doctrine adds "social reality" to the mix of judicial concerns. A satisfactory
answer, however, is more complex.
"Modem" French doctrine, which perceives failures in the grammar of the
Code, and which accepts the creative normative role of the French judiciary,
adds the need to produce theories of adjudication that can explain and justify
why the judge should interpret the Code-or creatively fill gaps in the
Code-in one way or another. French doctrine has attempted to produce such
theories. Different academics have offered somewhat different theories, but all
121. 1 id at 243.
122. 1 id at 242. As Gdny explains, the judge, faced with a firm line of precedent, can merely follow
it without further investigation, should rule according to it when unsure of the proper course to take, and
must set it aside only for truly decisive reasons. 2 GtNy, supra note 4, at 49 (footnote omitted).
[Jiudicial precedents, especially when they form a constant series of uniform decisions
constituting a bloc in a determinate direction, must possess, in the mind of the Interpreter.
considerable authority.-By this I mean not only that they will exercise over him a moral and
practical ascendancy, but furthermore, they will impose on his judgment a force of
conviction ....
Id. Carbonnier offers another typical explanation. He stresses that the filling of legislative gaps through
jurisprudence does consist of the creation of rules, even if judges may not constitutonally apply such rules
in other cases. His reasoning, Kantian in tone, is that such a judicial rule, "within the case, has the value
of a universal maxim." I CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 34. This explains why judges will later tend to
resolve similar cases according to the same criteria.
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of their efforts are structurally similar. In each case, judicial interpretation is
placed in the context of some overarching sociopolitical theory. G6ny and
Carbonnier, for instance, adopt more or less sociological theories of
adjudication, viewing the role of the judge as that of realizing "objective equity
by combining the idea of justice with that of the greatest social utility," or
"settling conflicts," or "making peace rule among men."'" Such conceptions
of the role of the judge are understood to carry certain basic directives: The
judge must be an agent of legal progress, he must modernize the law, he must
clarify the law, etc. The judicial implementation of these directives is itself to
be guided by certain policies, such as maximizing utility, maintaining stability
and continuity, or promoting coherence.
In short, modem French academic theories of adjudication all understand
the role of the judge to be goal-oriented.' 24 Gone is the image of the judge
who mechanically applies the provisions of an all-encompassing and all-
generating legislative code. The judge exercises a role that has sociopolitical
meaning and purpose. If the legislative code fails to do justice to this role, then
the judge not only can, but must creatively supplement the Code. It is not that
modem French legal theory has rendered the Civil Code irrelevant. Rather, it
has placed the Code in the context of a larger hermeneutic: the purposive role
of adjudication and of judges in the French sociopolitical system. The judicial
role consists of interpretation not only of the Code, and not only of the social
needs and values of the day, but also of the very purpose of adjudication. In
contemporary French legal scholarship, judging acquires meaning and purpose
not through the all-embracing grammar of the Code, but through the logic of
sociopolitical theories external to the Code. The task of the French civil judge
has come to be perceived as purposive: It should be guided and directed by the
policies associated with the various metatheories. As things now stand in
mainstream French legal theory, if the judge must be "creative" in order to
fulfill his purposive and policy-oriented role, then so be it.
It would be a mistake, however, to overestimate the extent to which, in
modem French academic doctrine's conception of the judicial role, the
grammar of the Code has been supplanted by the logic of policy orientation.
G6ny proposed only that the judge engage in "free scientific research"-guided
by "the idea of justice" and "the greatest social utility"-in those cases where
existing legislation did not resolve a conflict, i.e., when the judge was
confronted by a legislative gap.'25 He never truly doubted or questioned
whether the judge was bound by the express provisions of statutory law; he
simply insisted that the grammar of the Code could not generate judicial
123. See I CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 341; 1 GtNY, supra note 4, at 145.
124. See supra text accompanying note 99.
125. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Gdny actually goes significantly further Free scientific
research only comes into play in the absence of explicitly controlling legislative or customary rules.
2 GtNY, supra note 4, at 222.
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responses in those cases whose facts were beyond the purview of existing
Code provisions. Carbonnier, in his Droit civil, presents Gdny's understanding
as the "current conception" of the judicial role. Even Tunc, who argues so
forcefully that the Cour de cassation should make explicit the policy decisions
that actually motivate its decisions, implies that most cases are covered by
legislative provisions. He doubts that cases governed by a legislative text
would tend to work their way up to the Cour de cassation. 16 On the one
hand, this means that the Cour's cases involve judicially created principles. On
the other, this suggests that the traditional grammar readily disposes of the
majority of cases actually covered by a legislative text.
Mainstream French academics do recognize the interpretive latitude of the
judge who faces existing Code provisions, but they do not make clear to what
extent they believe such interpretive latitude exists, nor do they draw explicit
conclusions about its implications. Carbonnier, for example, explains that
judges can and do render equity judgments not only when they fill gaps in
existing legislation, but also when they choose "between two interpretations of
statutory law."' 127 But how often do judges face such an interpretive choice?
What conclusion is to be drawn from Carbonnier's Realist-inspired observation
that, "quite often," judges operate the judicial syllogism in reverse, "positing
the concrete decision that strikes them as humanly desirable, and then
endeavor[ing] to work back to a legal rule"?28 What does such interpretive
practice imply about the judicial role? Such questions are not discussed. These
authors take it for granted that the traditional form of the French judicial
decision masks the exercising of judicial creativity, but they are unwilling to
draw explicit conclusions concerning the theoretical tenability of a code-based
legal system.
The result is the academic production of an uneasy compromise between
the traditional French portrait of the judicial role and the sweeping conclusions
that might be drawn from the criticisms that modern French academics have
leveled against that portrait. This important compromise, suggested by modern
academics' unwillingness to address judicial creativity other than in the context
of perceived failures or gaps in the Code, manifests itself in French legal
theory's endless preoccupation with the "sources of the law." Given modern
French theory's acceptance of the creative role played by judges (even if only
when the facts of a case reveal gaps in the Code), the issue then becomes what
status to accord such judicial creation. The issue is of enormous importance
to the French because the notion of judicial creativity runs so completely
counter to the official portrait of the passive civil judge. The debate over the
sources of the law enables French legal academics to defuse the drastic
126. See supra note 112.
127. 1 CARBONNIER, supra note 76, at 35-36.
128. See Carbonnier's reference to Judge Hutcheson. supra note 88.
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conclusions that might be drawn from their own critiques. It allows them to
note and justify the judicial creation of normative rules, while permitting them
to deny such judicial creations the formal status of Law (which, according to
the traditional French conception, can only be of legislative origin).
The debate over the sources of the law therefore functions as a conceptual
device for raising certain interpretive problems without threatening the
fundamental bases of the French politico-legal structure. The debate represents
modem French academia's resort to a formal distinction that permits the
perpetuation of the traditional claim of absolute legislative supremacy. The
formal distinction is between "fact" and "law": All right, argues the academic,
French judges do in fact create normative rules.'29 Judges must create such
norms, especially when a case demonstrates the existence of a legislative gap.
But that does not mean that such judicial norms constitute Law. Only the
Legislature can create Law, as Article 5 of the Civil Code and the Law on
Judicial Organization make abundantly clear. Of course, the argument goes,
such judicial norms may in fact operate more or less as if they were Law, and
they may in fact become Law in one way or another, but that does not mean
that they are Law in and of themselves. In short, jurisprudence is not a real
source of the law. This account explains and justifies why the French judiciary
creates legal norms, and it permits the introduction of sociopolitical theories
that suggest how the judge should exercise this creative power. But at the same
time, it avoids challenging the notion of complete legislative supremacy. The
debate over the sources of the law, combined with the ritual distinction
between fact and law, therefore salvages as much as possible of the traditional
French conception of the codified legal system.
Modem, mainstream French academic doctrine therefore contains, and
seeks to maintain, a fundamental tension. French doctrine tends to understand
the tension as existing between the legal code and changing social
realities.130 I propose that the tension be understood in interpretive terms:
The tension is between grammatical and hermeneutic conceptions of
adjudication, that is, between the grammatical conception that gives priority to
the Code's ability to generate required legal outcomes and the hermeneutic
conception that gives priority to a sociopolitical theory's ability to produce
meaningful legal solutions. The tension between these two interpretive
approaches yields a tension between one mode of discourse that centers on the
text of the Code, and another that stresses the policy goals to be achieved.
By focusing on the tension between formal grammar and policy
hermeneutics, one can begin to understand the importance, to the entire French
civil judicial system, of the concept of the sources of the law. The concept
129. This proposition has become so mundane in French academic theory that it is known simply as
"the fact of jurisprudence." See, e.g.. BELAID, supra note 86, at 65-66.
130. See Andr6-Jean Arnaud, Le medium et le savant: signification politlque de l'interprdtation
juridique, in UINTERPRtrATION DANS LE DROIT 165, 166 (1972).
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mediates between, on the one hand, the grammatical discourse of the official
French portrait of the judicial role, and, on the other, the hermeneutic discourse
of the unofficial portrait. It facilitates and justifies the simultaneous existence
of two distinct discursive spheres (the official and the unofficial) in which two
modes of reading are brought to the fore, and in which two portraits of judging
are maintained.
B. The French Magistrat's Unofficial Discourse
As the previous Section demonstrates, modem French doctrine offers a
very different image of the judicial role-both as it is and as it should be
exercised-than that implicit in the official portrait. In French doctrine, the
resulting tension, which is between grammatical and hermeneutic modes of
reading, plays itself out in (or is maintained by) such concepts as the sources
of the law. As mainstream academic theory both reflects and informs legal and
judicial practice, the unofficial portrait (and the resulting tension its existence
produces) should manifest itself somewhere within the judicial system itself.
It does manifest itself, but in a discursive sphere internal to the French judicial
system, in which magistrats present arguments to their brethren about how the
cases before them should be decided. This Section therefore explores the
unofficial portrait of the judicial role, as it is reflected in the argumentation of
judicial magistrats.
1. The Advocate General and the Reporting Judge
The advocates general are a corps of magistrats who argue before the civil
law courts in an amicus curiae capacity. They constitute a branch of the
ministkre public, a ministry that, under the ancien r6gime, acted as the agent
of the crown before the courts; the ministry argued the interests of the King
and, in later years, the interests of society as well. 3 ' At present, though
nominally a part of the executive branch,1'32 the ministry has retained only
the latter function, slightly modified: It argues on behalf of the public welfare,
society's interest, and the proper application of the law.' 33 At least one of its
members is attached to almost every major court in the French judicial system.
In civil trials, a member of the ministbre sits on the high bench with the
131. PERROT, supra note 48, at 259; see The Law on Judicial Organization. supra note 39. art. I ('The
officers of the ministre public are agents of the executive power before the courts. Their functions consist
of insuring the observance, in the judgments to be rendered, of the laws that concern the public welfare.
and to insure the execution of the judgments rendered."). see also C. ORG. JUD. art. L 751-2 (current
judicial Code) ("In civil matters, the ministire public .... oversees the execution of statutory laws, rulings,
and judgments. He pursues such execution ex officio in dispositions that concern the public welfare ").
132. The advocate general does not act or argue on behalf of the State or of the executive. He does.
however, ensure the execution of judicial judgments. See C. ORG. JUD. art. L. 751-2.
133. PERROT, supra note 48, at 260.
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members of the court, and presents her arguments, in a document known as her
conclusions,'34 after the parties to the litigation have argued their respective
positions. 135  Structurally, therefore, the ministre public occupies a
privileged, intermediate position between the parties and the court,
Institutionally and professionally, the advocates general are truly the
judiciary's brethren. Advocates general and members of the judiciary are both
classified as magistrats: The former are floor magistrats, the latter sitting
magistrats. They receive their education and training in the same school,
L'tc6le Nationale de la Magistrature.136 As members of the same
magistrature corps, those magistrats assigned to the bench can transfer to the
floor, and vice versa.
137
The discourse of the advocates general offers valuable insight into the
French judicial system's institutional self-understanding. Legal argumentation
intended to persuade judges must conform to certain norms. The argumentative
discourse carries an implicit conception of what is relevant to judicial decision
making, and thus, of the proper role of the French judge. At the same time, the
discourse of the advocates general emanates from members of the magistrature
itself. As such, it reflects the magistrature's own conception of the judicial
role.
Equally probative is the discourse of the "reporting judge." One judge on
every case before a French appellate court panel, and one Justice on every case
before the Cour de cassation, is designated the reporting judge. The reporting
judge's original function, developed in the fourteenth century, consisted of
sifting through case documents and evidence brought to Paris from provincial
courts for full-scale appellate review before the Parlement. He would work
through the mass of evidence and would propose a judicial solution to the
other members of the Parlement.138 At present, the reporting justice serves
a similar function for the Cour de cassation. He reviews the lower court
records, formulates and researches the legal issues, and suggests to the rest of
the Cour how to resolve the case. Like other members of the Cour, the
134. Whenever I refer to a particular conclusions, I shall treat it as a singular noun. This will avoid
confusion when I later refer to several conclusions at a time, or when I refer to conclusions in general (in
which case I will treat the noun as a plural).
135. PERROT, supra note 48, at 269. The member of the ministate does not take part in the
deliberations or judgment of the court. C. ORG. JUD. art. R. 751-1.
Until recently, the ministare public was required to attend most trials and to submit to the court his
position on the proper outcome of the litigation. In most cases, the ministare's attendance and argument
were fictitious; the ministre would symbolize its presence by leaving one of its wigs on the lectern, and
would simply state that it left the resolution of the case to the wisdom of the court. At present, the
participation of the ministate public is mostly optional, except at the Cour de cassation level. For a concise
account of the composition and attributions of the public ministry, see generally PERROT. supra note 48,
at 269-90.
136. PERROT, supra note 48, at 264, 310.
137. Id. at 264-65.
138. See DAWSON, supra note 2, at 277; PAUL GUILHIERMOZ, ENQUtrES ET PROCts 157-63 (Paris,
Durand 1892).
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reporting judge takes part in the judicial deliberations and voting."39 His
findings and proposed resolution are known as his rapport.
Due to their inaccessability, conclusions and rapports have never been
presented or analyzed in any significant sense. The result has been a skewed
understanding of how the French judicial system actually operates.
2. The Inaccessibility of Conclusions and Rapports
Unlike the formal decisions of the French courts, both the conclusions and
rapports represent documents internal to the French judicial system. Even
those produced at the Cour de cassation are rarely published. For example, the
Recueil Dalloz, the French equivalent of West Reports, publishes on average
a mere four to six conclusions and only one or two rapports per year, despite
the fact that a conclusions and a rapport are produced in preparation of every
Cour de cassation decision."O Furthermore, gaining access to unpublished
conclusions and rapports is exceptionally difficult, even for an academic
engaged in general research. 4' The rapports, in particular, are considered to
be highly personal documents. They are regarded as the property of their
authors, and it is customary for the reporting justice to take back, physically,
certain sections of his rapport from the Cour's dossier once the case has been
decided. 42 As a practical matter, even once one has access to the Cour's
closed dossiers it is essential that the case in question be recent enough that
the repossession of the rapport has not yet taken place, or that its author has
not bothered to repossess it. The rapports may also be protected by the secrecy
of judicial deliberations, and therefore protected by law as a part of the judicial
sys.tem's internal workings, which are not open to the public.' The
conclusions of the advocate general, on the other hand, are-nominally, at
least-public documents. As a practical matter, however, they are not
significantly more accessible than the rapports. They linger in the Cour's
dossiers; access to them therefore requires quite a chain of letters of
introduction.
139. The reporting judge's name is listed in small pnnt at the end of the court's decision, along with
the names of the senior judge and the advocate general.
140. The Cour's Annual Report, which details the Cour's activity over the previous year. publishes
another two or three of the year's important conclusions, and usually publishes one more rapport See. e.g.
1992 ANN. REP. (1993). By all indications, the Bulletin officiel des arr&ts de la Chambre civil de la Cour
de cassation (the Cour's official reporter) publishes none at all.
141. Successfully gaining access provided a few more examples of conclusions and rapports. but more
important, provided certain insights into the internal interpretive practice of the French judiciary
142. Interview with Pascal Chauvin. Secrdtaire Gdnfral de la Prem r e Pr&isdence de la Cour de
cassation, in Paris, France (Dec. 13, 1993).
143. Article 448 of the New Civil Procedure Code (Nouveau Code de Proc durc Civile INC, Pt. Civ I)
provides simply that "the deliberations of the judges are secret." Some magistrats claim that Article 448
applies to the rapports, others not. The occasion has apparently never arisen to settle the issue in court.
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3. Two Introductory Examples: A Conclusions and a Rapport
This Subsection presents, and briefly analyzes, a conclusions of an
advocate general and a rapport of a reporting judge. These examples, which
show how French magistrats debate legal issues in their internal discursive
sphere, demonstrate that the French judiciary operates under a different
understanding of the judicial role than that implicit in the official portrait. As
will become readily apparent, these examples require a new account of how
the French legal and judicial systems actually function.
a. The Conclusions of an Advocate General
The following typical example presents arguments by an advocate general
before a chamber of the Cour de cassation. The case involves a plaintiff who
was injured in a moped accident. Defendant's insurance company reached a
settlement with plaintiff. Subsequently, however, plaintiff required surgery with
costs exceeding the settlement. The lower courts rescinded the original
settlement on the grounds that (a) the accident was the cause of the surgery,
and (b) the need for the surgery was not foreseeable at the time of the
settlement. The insurance company appealed. As the following translation
demonstrates, Advocate General Lindon's conclusions evinces a different
understanding of the judicial role than that posited by the official portrait of
the French civil judge.
The case that is submitted to you poses the problem of the scope
and limits of settlements between accident victims and insurance
companies.
[Lindon recounts the facts and the lower court decisions.]
According to this decision [of the appellate court], which, as I
will later show, does nothing other than rely on the most recent
jurisprudence, one must distinguish between, on the one hand,
mistake as to the gravity, the aggravation of a harm known at the time
of the settlement and whose severity would have been underestimated
by the victim, and on the other, mistake as to the object, the
appearance of complications normally unforeseeable at the time of the
settlement.
I would first like to explain myself on the first aspect of the
principles thus posed.
As you know, insurance companies require, at the time of a
settlement, the signing of releases whose terms include in a very clear
fashion all the future consequences of the accident. From that point
forward, taking present legislation into account, one may not, legally,
put into question a settlement on the grounds that the damage known
at the time of the settlement, and which this settlement had as its
object to repair, has worsened. Otherwise one would open the door to
the rescission of all settlements.
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But I believe that because of the particular nature of corporeal
damage, the strict observation of this rule leads to results that, from
the point of view of humanity, from the point of view of equity, are
extremely shocking.
Here are some examples.
[Lindon refers to a past decision rendered by the same chamber
of the Cour de cassation and proposes two hypothetical cases in order
to demonstrate that accident victims (e.g., poor children) might be
better off refusing to settle with insurance companies lest they find
themselves barred from receiving payment for the treatment of injuries
unforeseen at the time of the settlement, which would of course leave
the children financially incapable of receiving any treatment at all in
the meantime.] And thus, in the current state of the law in the matter,
parents are compelled to submit the health of their child to the fate of
a bet! Do I not have the right to use the epithet "shocking" to
describe such results?
[Lindon reminds the members of the Cour that, as he has often
informed them before, judicial awards to accident victims are open to
later revision in favor of the victim.] Many decisions have been
rendered in this direction, and one finds several cited by MM.
Mazeaud, in their Traiti de la responsabilite.
[Lindon then points out that labor law and social security law
each allow damages awarded the victims of work-related accidents to
be revised, referring to numerous judicial cases along the way. He
also discusses the problem of increasing use of the courts as a means
to revise damage awards.]
S.. [T]he principle itself was not self-evident;[' ] ....
One must therefore find an explanation for the new legislation
regarding revision in cases of work-related accidents and for the
jurisprudence just mentioned. One exists, and I do not pretend to have
discovered it because, to tell the truth, it was discerned by the case
commentator who signed, under the name of F.M., the comment
published in the Dalloz on a decision of the Cour de cassation of
December 1, 1942. It is the idea of reparation when it applies to a
violation of physical integrity.[145]
You know that contractual waiver clauses are not considered valid
when it is a question of such violations .... And one can very well
imagine that, consciously or not, the legislator and the judge were
inspired by this idea .... Why does this same idea not prevail in the
case of a settlement? Well, it is apparently because it runs up against
the general rules governing settlements, which must have an inclusive
and definitive character.
I am therefore led to conclude that if the jurisprudence that
disallows rescission after settlement for aggravation of the damage
144. Lindon is expressing qualms about the revision of judicial damage awards, noting the apparent
contradiction with the doctrine of res judicata. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
145. The violation of physical integrity refers to corporeal injury.
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that the settlement sought to repair is legally and technically justified,
it nonetheless constitutes a stain on the totality of our positive law.
And this conclusion leads to another, namely, that the best
solution would be legislative.
It would certainly not be impossible for the courts to make an
exception to the applicable rules on settlements when they are faced
with a violation of physical integrity.... And in this respect, we have
a precedent that fits the bill ....
But, Sirs, it is not for you to make the statutory laws. Your
domain is jurisprudence. Well, to come back to today's case, it is
neither an upheaval, nor even a softening of jurisprudence that I
invite you to produce, because the debate is situated not on the level
of rescission for mistake as to the gravity of the injury, but on that of
mistake as to the object of the settlement.
In short, what the appellant insurance company invites you to say
is that in matters of settlements entered into after corporeal
accidents, that once they are composed, there can never be a mistake
as to the object ....
But this thesis does not agree with that of certain decisions that
you have recently rendered.
Here, first of all, is a decision of July 9, 1963 ....
Might this decision not have served as a model for the decision
challenged before you today?
More recently, on October 29, 1963, your Chamber judged ....
And conversely, on February 22, 1965, you judged ....
Well, Sirs, the decision challenged before you today fits
altogether in the line of the decisions that I have just cited.
Without it even being a question of overturning your
jurisprudence regarding the aggravation of corporeal injury, although
I hope that you will do so on the first possible occasion, this is only
about maintaining and consolidating your jurisprudence regarding
mistake as to the object.
I ask you to do so and conclude in favor of rejecting the
appeal. 146
Lindon, a high-ranking magistrat, presents two different lines of argument
that assume that the Justices of the Cour play an active role in the development
and application of legal norms. The first frames the case in terms of a
possible-and desired-conflict between the Code and the Cour's
jurisprudence. The relevant Code provision, Article 2053, permits the
rescission of a settlement only if there has been a mistake as to its object. But
"strict observation of this rule," argues Lindon, "leads to results that, from the
146. Conclusions of Advocate General Lindon, Judgment of March 8, 1966, Cass. civ. Ire, 1966 J.C.P.
II, No. 14,664, at 1-3 (citations omitted). In pragmatic terms, to "reject the appeal" is to affirm the decision
being appealed.
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point of view of humanity, from the point of view of equity, are extremely
shocking."'14 7 The insurers argue in favor of precisely such a result. Lindon
urges the Cour to create new jurisprudence that would permit rescission for a
mistake relating to the gravity of the physical injuries covered by a settlement.
Lindon then presents his second line of argument. This particular case
actually involves a mistake as to the object of the settlement: The injuries
suffered by the victim were unforeseen and unforeseeable at the time of the
settlement. Lindon thus assures the Cour that the case is "only about
maintaining and consolidating [its] jurisprudence regarding mistake as to
object."'' 48 Because the appellate court's decision follows the Cour's previous
decisions, it should be affirmed.
Lindon's arguments present a portrait of the judicial role that is difficult
to square with the official French portrait of the civil judge. Lindon clearly
disapproves of Section 2053 of the Code. He posits that the Cour could and
perhaps should, in the absence of legislative action, unilaterally establish an
exception to the applicable Code provision. Lindon proposes that the Cour
modify the apparent dictates of the Code by modifying its own jurisprudence.
Although Lindon finds such judicial action unnecessary in the case at hand, he
nonetheless urges that it be taken as soon as possible.4 9 The implication is
that the Cour's jurisprudence possesses normative power in some way
comparable to that of the Code. Judges and their jurisprudence can legitimately
and intentionally modify legislative rules.' 50 For example, Lindon states:
"[Even] if the jurisprudence that disallows rescission after settlement for
aggravation of [injuries] is legally and technically justified, it nonetheless
constitutes a stain on the totality of our positive law."'' Lindon understands
jurisprudence as constituting part of France's positive law. He portrays the
French legislator and judge as operating in the same sphere. Thus, contractual
clauses denying liability for tortious physical injuries are considered invalid
because, "consciously or not, the legislator and the judge were inspired by this
[same] idea."'
152
Although Lindon's first argument offers the more striking substantive
claim for the normative power of the French judge, Lindon fashions a similar
claim through his extensive use of precedent. Lindon refers to no fewer than
nine cases, cites eight, quotes extensively from four, and even refers the
147. Id. at I.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Lindon is not merely suggesting that the Cour adopt an alternative interpretation of the Code
provision that would permit the rescission of certain settlements. He states that "taking present legislation
into account, one may not, legally, put into question a settlement on the grounds that the damage was
known at the time of the settlement." Id. at I. His proposal to the Cour requires the intentional modification
of the applicable legislative rule. See id.
150. Given the language of Article 2053 of the Code. some might well argue that Lindon proposes
a judicial rule that would intentionally eviscerate the legislative rule.
151. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 146. at 2.
152. Id at 2 (emphasis added).
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Justices to an academic treatise that contains further judicial examples. At the
same time, Lindon hardly mentions the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.
Although he twice refers to Section 2053, he only does so when presenting the
appellant insurer's losing argument. Furthermore, while he quotes the text of
the judicial precedents, he only paraphrases the text of the relevant Code
provisions. 153 Thus, the method as well as the substance of the argument
empower case law over statutory authority.
The substantive thrust of Lindon's conclusions is based on the importance
of the Cour's precedent. He argues not only that the affirmation of the
appellate decision would not overturn or weaken established precedent, but that
the appellate decision perfectly accords with that line of precedent. Lindon
strongly suggests that the appellate decision was itself modeled upon the
Cour's own decision in an earlier case. He therefore argues that the Cour
should not overturn an appellate decision that clearly follows the Cour's own
line of precedent.
By the end of Lindon's analysis, the force of precedent becomes the
centerpiece of the conclusions. The concluding paragraph states that "this
[case] is only about maintaining and consolidating your jurisprudence
regarding mistake as to the object."' 54 The statutory argument has completely
disappeared. The normative power of judicial precedent, rather than that of the
Code, drives the argument.
The difference in tone between Lindon's discourse and that of the
paradigmatic French judicial decision is also worthy of note. Lindon argues in
a conversational style. Not only does he begin several sentences with the
familiar expression "Et bien" ("Well"), his arguments also reflect his personal
experience before these very judges: "You know, Sirs, and I have often had
the occasion to note it before you, that .... , He does not shrink from
speaking in the first person, nor from expressing his very personal opinion on
legal matters. 56 His argumentative style, in contrast to that of the official
French judicial opinion, fosters the impression that room exists for discussion.
The matter open for discussion includes the choice of options available to the
Justices in the disposition, not only of the particular case before them, but also
of the entire class of cases to which this case belongs.
153. Articles 2052 and 2053 of the Civil Code state, in pertinent part:
Art. 2052. Settlements possess, for the parties involved, the authority of a matter adjudged
without appeal.
They cannot be challenged on the basis of legal error or inadequacy of consideration.
Art. 2053. Nonetheless, a settlement may be rescinded when there has been a mistake as
to .... the object contested.
C. civ. arts. 2052-53.
154. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 146, at 3.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. ("Do I not have the right to use the epithet 'shocking' to describe such results?").
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Some of the substantive options suggested by Lindon, such as the judicial
establishment of an exception to the applicable Code provision, are astonishing,
as is the very mode of his argumentation. Lindon raises social policy concerns:
In the name of "humanity" and "equity," the Cour should modify the rule that
limits the rescission of settlements to circumstances involving a mistake as to
the object of the settlement. Lindon seeks to correct the "shocking" results
produced by the operation of the rule.
To advance this social policy argument, Lindon elaborates pragmatic
principles drawn from recent legislative and judicial texts)' 7 Relatively
recent French legislation and judicial decisions in the area of social security,
worker's compensation, and tort law stand for the principle that complete
reparations are particularly important in cases involving physical injury. This
principle, argues Lindon, should extend to cases arising under insurance
settlements. The Cour should advance this principle, even without appropriate
legislative action. It should therefore permit the rescission of settlements on the
basis of the mere aggravation of physical injuries. Lindon's countervailing
institutional policy concern is not that the judiciary might not be the proper
branch of government to establish and to implement this principle and its
corresponding social policy, but rather that allowing the judicial revision of
settlements might increase court congestion.5
Lindon's conclusions presents a portrait of the role of the French judge
that differs dramatically from the official portrait. Most important, Lindon's
arguments assume that judges play a crucial normative role in the development
and application of legal rules. The judicial enterprise is not understood as the
mechanical application of given legislative provisions, but rather as the
purposive elaboration of pragmatic principles. This process of elaboration
accords judicial precedents at least as much attention and authority as
legislative enactments; and the magistrat's primary mode of analysis is policy
discourse.
Nevertheless, advocates general are merely floor magistrats, not sitting
judges; for an even closer view into the judiciary's internal discourse, one
needs to look at the rapports of a reporting justice.' 59
157. "One must therefore find an explanation for the new legislation regarding revision in cases of
work-related accidents and for the jurisprudence just mentioned." Id. at 2.
158. Even Lindon's second argument is premised on policy concerns. He cautions that it would be bad
institutional policy to overturn an appellate decision that was apparently modeled on one of the Cour's own
recent precedents.
159. Throughout this Article, the term "judge" subsumes both judges on the loser courts and Justices
on the Cour de cassation.
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b. The Rapport of a Reporting Justice
An examination of a typical rapport demonstrates the similarities between
the conclusions of an advocate general and the rapport of a Justice of the Cour
de cassation. In a civil action for wrongful death, two plaintiffs-the victim's
wife, Mrs. Braesch, and a Mrs. Bechler, age seventy-two-sought the usual
money damages." Mr. Braesch had apparently left his wife for Mrs. Bechler
(also married) some thirty-five years prior to the accident, and they had lived
together ever since. The trial court rejected Mrs. Bechler's claim on the
grounds that a concubine could not sue for damages caused by the death of her
lover. The appellate court, however, overturned the ruling and ordered Bertrand
to "pay the said concubine an indemnity in reparation for her material and
emotional damages."' 6' In his rapport to his brethren, Justice Combaldieu of
the Cour de cassation argued as follows:
One is immediately tempted to conclude that solely the lower court
judge is empowered to determine, beyond all control of the Cour de
cassation, the existence and the extent of damages.
... But adultery and the maintenance of a concubine, or
complicity therein, constitute a crime, thus an illicit act. How, in such
conditions, could the concubine find in an illicit act the source of
indemnification, of whatever nature it may be?.. . Who does not
sense that such a result would run directly contrary to public welfare,
which, if it tolerates concubinage, must ensure the protection of the
institution of marriage? ... Any other solution would constitute an
encouragement given to adultery and to de facto bigamy....
... [S]hould not plain common sense and the most elementary
morality nevertheless place an insurmountable obstacle in the way of
she who dares publicly, even before the courts themselves, to ridicule
the institution of marriage and the legitimate family, to trample under
foot the articles of the Civil Code on spousal rights and obligations
by making herself the accomplice of the unfaithful spouse, and,
pushing impudence to the extreme, to claim as a title, with the goal
of gaining monetary profit, the adulterous relations that the law
condemns?
... Let us add, on the level of equity, that by moving in with a
married man, the concubine could not legitimately count on any legal
protection. Better yet: all illegal situations can damage he or she who
risks partaking in them; it is not up to him or her to make others bear
this risk.
160. Rapport of Justice Combaldieu, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1966, Cass. crim., 1966 D.S. Jur. 184. The
defendant was found guilty of involuntary homicide.
161. Id. at 185.
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It would, however, be well to consider, especially regarding the
reparation for damage, that it is advisable to prevent multiple and
concurrent suits, if one wishes to avoid ending up, as notes Professor
Flour, with absurdities.... [W)ho would actually dare give
preference to the concubine who has the audacity to rise beside the
legitimate spouse in order to claim-as the ancients would say-the
price of her debauchery? It would be advisable to consider that what
is at issue here are two mutually exclusive and contradictory claims.
[Combaldieu then states that Mrs. Bechler cannot be permitted to
collect damages for her lover's death and at the same time be capable
of receiving damages should her own husband die: She would be in
a better position than a legitimate spouse.]
That is why I believe, insofar as I am concerned, that the claim
of the concubine must be vigorously rejected. The public welfare has,
in fact, a direct stake in the protection of the institution of marriage,
has it not?
The state of jurisprudence on the indemnification of the
concubine's damages is too well known for it to be necessary to
discuss it at length.
Schematically, three tendencies appear to manifest themselves at
present within the Cour de cassation.
1.-The Criminal Chamber does not require a bond of kinship or
marriage, a simple factual certainty of damages incurred being
sufficient.
Besides, the decisions of the Criminal Chamber are nuanced in
this respect: They do not say, as they are sometimes made to say,
that, whatever the case may be, the concubine will obtain reparation.
The Criminal Chamber recognizes that the simple rupture of the state
of concubinage cannot alone justify the attribution of damages ... but
mostly, it arrogates the right to study in each case ... the "quality,"
so to speak, of the concubinage: It only retains those that are stable
and not precarious, and whose appearance resembles marriage.
Let us recall here that social legislation and the jurisprudence on
this issue have also recognized certain rights belonging to the
concubine; let us mention, for the sake of refreshing our memory,
that. . . [cites provisions of the Social Security Code and
jurisprudence of the Cour].
2.-The Second Civil Chamber requires, insofar as it is
concerned, that there be, according to the well-known formulation, a
"violation of a legally protected, legitimate interest".... The
concubine therefore finds herself excluded, without any other
distinctions.
3.-Finally, the First Civil Chamber has, in a decision noted by
legal commentary ... abandoned the necessity of a bond of kinship
or marriage in order to attribute reparation for emotional
damages ....
Whatever opinion one might have on the substance of the
problem, based on the angle under which one observes it, it is
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obviously regrettable that there be on this issue a divergence between
the chambers, when the regulatory role of the supreme Cour is
precisely to fix the unity of jurisprudence and to thus give firm rules
to parties and to the lower courts....
To identical problems are not given identical solutions, which has
the effect of perplexing the parties and the lower courts ... and to
offer targets to the scathing arrows that a good portion of academic
scholarship shoots at jurisprudence.
... [I]t appears, of course, that these divergences must not be
irreducible, and some authors have even suggested the bases of a
possible compromise; but these divergences undoubtedly can only be
made to disappear by a decision of the United Chambers [of the Cour]
or by a legislative intervention: but the setting into motion of one or
the other does not depend on the judicial power.
Thus, we think that the solution that we propose to the Criminal
Chamber remains in the line of the decisions that it has previously
rendered on the issue in the latest state of its jurisprudence: the mere
existence of a marriage-and a fortiori the presence of the legitimate
wife as a plaintiff for indemnification-must necessarily lead to
closing the door of the court to the concubine; a cumulation or
partition of damages is to be rejected.
One will object, perhaps, on the basis of the decisions of the other
chambers that give satisfaction to the claim of the concubine; but
concubinage does not in and of itself constitute a crime, as long as it
is not accompanied by an adultery ....
One will also object, perhaps, on the basis of the decision ... by
which the criminal jurisprudence, to the great scandal of civilists,
favorably received the civil action brought by a prostitute against her
pimp; but prostitution, no more than concubinage, does not constitute
in and of itself a crime.
... The proposed solution appears to fit smoothly in the jurispru-
dence of the Criminal Chamber; at the very most, it may seem more
reserved than a recent decision that the chamber rendered in the
matter of checks written with insufficient funds ... a decision whose
boldness had provoked some reservations.
If one absolutely insists on giving it the connotation of a
tendency, this solution appears to "hit the brakes" on the
jurisprudence on the concubine.
But who would dare complain about this "braking"? Would not
any other solution run the risk of being interpreted by the legitimate
wife as a slap in the face?
And is it not fortunate that the taking of such a position-if you
adopt it-might be considered as the laying of the first stone-a
modest one, no doubt, but nonetheless not negligible-in the
construction of a unified jurisprudence on the issue, so desired by all?
Did Portalis[162] not say:
162. Jean Portalis (1746-1807) was one of the main authors of the Civil Code.
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"It would be great evil if there were contradictions in the maxims
that govern men."
'163
The tone of Justice Combaldieu's rapport is quite similar to that of
Lindon's conclusions. Combaldieu argues as a single voice among many,
presenting his personal opinion to the Cour. His recommendation is just that,
a recommendation; it is not presented as the necessary grammatical response
to a fact situation. He personally believes that the concubine's claim should be
rejected."6
Like Advocate General Lindon, Justice Combaldieu bases his
recommendation on an analysis of judicial precedent. Not only is he aware of
existing judicial decisions, but he assumes that his audience is similarly
informed: "The state of the jurisprudence on the indemnification of the
concubine's prejudice is too well known for it to be necessary to discuss it at
length."'65 His method consists of mapping the various lines of judicial
precedent produced by the Cour, and proposing a solution as consistent with
them as possible.
In his analysis, Combaldieu cites eight specific decisions and identifies
three lines of precedent that offer different approaches and solutions. 1 66 Of
perhaps greater significance, Combaldieu quotes the key language from the
three lines of decision, suggesting that French judges treat precedent as legal
norms. The lines of precedent can be identified, distinguished, and
encapsulated; for each court that has produced precedent, its language carries
significant normative force. Combaldieu states, for instance, that "[t]he
Criminal Chamber does not require a bond of kinship or marriage,' 67 while
"the Second Civil Chamber requires that there be, according to the well-known
formulation, 'the violation of a legally protected, legitimate interest."' 6
Each of the courts overtly "requires" that the plaintiff demonstrate a particular
kind of damage; each court has established its own normative rule.'"
Combaldieu's approach suggests that judicial precedent possesses
something more than merely persuasive force.'70 But the normative power
of the judicially constructed rules is not absolute: Combaldieu never states that
the Criminal Chamber's jurisprudence must be followed.' By presenting the
163. Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160, at 185-87.
164. Id. at 186 ("That is why I believe, insofar as I am concerned, that the claim of the concubine
must be vigorously rejected.").
165. Id.




169. Cf Interview with Raymond Exertier, Premier President of the Cour d'appel de Toulouse. in
Toulouse, France (Feb. 3, 1994) ("I must maintain my jurisprudence.").
170. See Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160, at 186 ("The 2nd Civil Chamber nquires
(emphasis added).
171. The case was tried before the Cour's criminal chamber.
1995] 1367
The Yale Law Journal
jurisprudence of the other Chambers, he implies that the Criminal Chamber
possesses significant latitude in the application of precedent. Nonetheless,
Combaldieu's rapport makes sure to stress that "the solution that we propose
to the Criminal Chamber remains in the line of decisions that it has previously
rendered on this issue in the latest state of its jurisprudence."'
72
Although Combaldieu's primary argument presents a solution consistent
with the jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber, Combaldieu strongly believes
that the jurisprudence of the various chambers of the Cour de cassation should
be unified. 73 While it is unclear whether the "giving of firm rules" is
understood to mean the judicial creation of law or simply the production of a
single interpretation of the statutory law, Combaldieu suggests that the Cour
is capable of performing a normative function quite similar to that of the
legislative branch. 7 4
Until such legislative or United Chambers action is taken, the Cour must
produce a solution to the case at bar. The Code gives no clear answer to how
the Cour should render its decision. 75 Combaldieu, sensitive to "the scathing
arrows that a good portion of academic scholarship shoots at [the Cour's]
jurisprudence,"'' 76 cites and quotes from no fewer than a half-dozen academic
writers. His own argument, far from presenting the grammatical necessity of
a given application of the Code, hinges on policy analysis.
Combaldieu presents social and institutional policy arguments under the
headings of public welfare, morality, and equity. He first asks: "Who does not
sense that such a result would run directly contrary to the public welfare,
which, if it tolerates concubinage, must assure the protection of the institution
of marriage?"'177 After discussing "plain common sense and the most
elementary morality,"'' 78 Combaldieu turns to equity: "Let us add, on the
level of equity, that by moving in with a married man, the concubine could not
legitimately count on any legal protection."'' 79 Combaldieu then incorporates
economic policy by suggesting that the concubine must assume the risk of her
illicit behavior; she cannot ask a third party to bear or share the risk. Finally,
Combaldieu is highly conscious of the Cour's decision as an institutional
172. Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160, at 186.
173. Id. ("Mhe regulatory role of the supreme Cour is precisely to fix the unity of jurisprudence and
to give firm rules to parties and to the lower courts.").
174. See id. ("Mhese divergences undoubtedly can only be made to disappear by a decision of the
United Chambers [of the Cour] or by a legislative intervention."). The "United Chambers" ("chambres
rdunies," now known as "Assemblie pIdniare") consists of a composite panel of the Cour de cassation
drawn from the ranks of the Cour's various chambers. Its primary role is to fix a point of law over which
there is disagreement or conflict within the judiciary. See PERROT, supra note 48, at 200-01.
175. The only clearly applicable Code provision is Article 1382, upon which virtually all of French
tort law is based. It states: "Any human action that causes damage to another obliges the one by whose
fault it occurred to repair it."
176. Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160, at 186.
177. Id. at 185.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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response to the issues raised by the case. He argues for the Cour's creation of
a unified jurisprudence; if this is not feasible, he implicitly recommends that
the Cour follow the Criminal Chamber's own line of precedent. As
Combaldieu's concluding statements demonstrate, this new institutional
response is overtly pragmatic, purposive, and forward-looking."W He calls
upon his brethren to take a programmatic, normative stand based on assorted
social, economic, and institutional policy considerations.
The unofficial discourse of judicial magistrats demonstrates that the French
judge does not approach cases as perfectly individualized fact scenarios merely
to be plugged into the grammatical matrix of the Code. The conclusions of the
advocates general and the rapports of the reporting judges stress the perceived
gaps, conflicts, ambiguities, and even insufficiencies of the Code. In these legal
arguments, the judicial enterprise consists largely of pragmatic case analysis
and policy discussion. The judiciary is aware of past decisions, understood to
carry significant normative force, and feels considerable institutional pressure
to respect precedent, while seeking to produce coherent responses to the issues
raised by new cases.
C. A Detailed Analysis of the French Judicial Magistrats
Unofficial Discourse
In order to understand the complex relationship between the official and
unofficial portraits of the French civil judge, it is necessary to perform a more
detailed analysis of the conclusions and rapports.' s Given the dominant




To one accustomed to French judicial decisions, the length of the
conclusions and rapports is the first surprising characteristic of these
documents. Cour de cassation decisions typically run a single typewritten page.
The few conclusions and rapports published in the Recueil Dalloz, on the
other hand, can be five times as long. Upon opening dossiers of the Cour de
180. This institutional response represents "taking a stand." Its tendency would be to act as a "brake"
on the jurisprudence that favors concubines, and it would "happily" constitute the "first stone" in the
creation of a "unified jurisprudence."
181. Given the scarcity of available examples, it is impossible to organize the analysis on the basis
of subjects addressed by doctrine, or to follow the rapports produced in a line of Cour de casston cases
interpreting a given article of the Civil Code. The analysis therefore focuses on the common characteristics
of the several dozen examples of conclusions and rapports that I have been able to gather, regardless of
the substantive issues that they happen to address.
182. The rapports and conclusions do present, however, significant funcuonal and stylistic differences.
which I shall note whenever necessary.
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cassation, however, one discovers that conclusions and rapports can routinely
be fifty pages long; the conclusions and rapports published in the Recueil
Dalloz, as it turns out, are heavily edited. The length of the unedited
documents demonstrates that there is quite a bit more, so to speak, to the
French judge's interpretive practice than official French judicial decisions
would lead one to believe. Fifty-page syllogisms, after all, are rather difficult
to envision.
The typical conclusions or rapport comprises a few basic elements, which
are often labeled by section headings, or separated by typographical markers
such as a line of asterisks, or distinguished by numbered paragraphs. The
conclusions or rapport may also take the form of a single, unbroken text. The
composition of these documents suggests a certain freedom from formal
requirements. Substantively, however, most conclusions and rapports cover the
same set of legal bases.
These documents typically begin with a presentation of the facts and
procedural history of the case. The presentation of the facts, while more
complete than what one finds in a French appellate court decision, nonetheless
remains fairly terse by American standards; one or two paragraphs suffice, 83
although it is not unusual for a fact section to run as long as a page or
two.' 8 The presentation of the case's procedural history, often intertwined
with the presentation of the facts, is more detailed. The case is tracked through
the judicial system, and it is routine for the lower court rulings to be quoted
at length.
After the presentation of the facts and procedural history, the conclusions
or rapport proceeds to the legal analysis. This analysis consists of an
examination of relevant French legislation, such as Civil Code provisions or
other legislative enactments; judicial precedent; academic publications; and any
appropriate foreign (usually European) legislative norms or judicial solutions.
The conclusions or rapport may devote more or less of its space to one or
another of these fundamental legal considerations, addressing them one after
the other or simultaneously. It is also common for the conclusions or rapport
to follow the organization of the appellant's brief, responding to its claims in
the order in which they are presented.'
While the conclusions or rapport may contain prefatory remarks on basic
issues presented by the case (whether identified as legal, moral, philosophical,
183. See, e.g., Conclusions of Advocate General Joinet, Judgment of Feb. 2, 1990, 1990 Bull. Civ.
I, No. 2, at 2, in 1990 ANN. REP. 147, 149 (1991); Rapport of Justice Massip, Judgment of Apr. 26, 1988,
Cass. civ. Ire, 1988 D.S. Jur. 469; Conclusions of Advocate General Charbonnler, Judgment of Nov. 13,
1987, 1987 Bull. Civ. I, No. 5, at 11, in 1987 ANN. REP. 108, 108 (1988).
184. See, e.g., Conclusions of Advocate General Dorwling-Carter, Judgment of July 1i, 1989, in 1989
ANN. REP. 85, 85-86, 86-87 (1991); unpublished rapports (on file with author).
185. See, e.g., Rapport of Justice Massip, Judgment of Dec. 13, 1989, Cass. civ. Ire, 1990 D.S. Jur.
273; Rapport of Justice Sargos, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1986, Cass. civ. Ire, 1986 D.S. Jur. 573.
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or social), it is also common for the magistrat to devote separate sections to
these issues"' or to weave the discussion into the rest of the argument."
The conclusions or rapport typically ends with some closing remarks that
propose, given the analysis presented, that the court dispose of the case in a
certain fashion. These concluding remarks take a somewhat different form
depending on whether the analysis has been performed by an advocate general
(conclusions) or by a reporting judge (rapport). In the case of conclusions, the
advocate general adopts a clear-cut position either in favor of quashing the
lower court decision or in favor of rejecting the appeal. His final conclusion
is usually stated in the following terms: "I therefore conclude in favor of
quashing," or "in favor of rejection of the appeal."' s
In the case of rapports, however, the closing remarks tend to be less
categorical. Although the reporting judge usually makes quite clear, over the
course of his analysis, how he thinks the case should be decided, he frames his
concluding remarks as a mere suggestion, or, as is more often the case, offers
no formal suggestion at all, stating that he leaves it to the Cour to decide how
the case should be handled. Thus, for example, a rapport ends: "It is up to the
Chamber [of the Cour], given these various considerations, to take sides on the
opportuneness of deciding without delay the interesting but delicate problem
that your reporting judge has just presented to you."' The rapport's closing
remarks therefore suggest that its author has merely presented the various
facets of a given legal issue, and that it will be up to the Cour to decide how
to resolve it.
This open-ended character of the rapport hints at what turns out to be an
astonishing aspect of the work of the reporting judge and of the day-to-day
practice of the Cour de cassation. This aspect can be observed only by gaining
access to the Cour's closed dossiers. Each dossier contains the lower court
decisions, the written arguments of the opposing attorneys (complete with
supporting documentation), the conclusions of the advocate general, and
finally, the rapport. The unedited rapport explains the facts and procedural
history of the case, and then provides the reporting judge's legal analysis,
including his avis, i.e., his opinion of how the case should be decided."
186. See, e.g., Conclusions of Dorwling-Carter, supra note 184. at 85.
187. See, e.g., Conclusions of Lindon, supra text accompanying note 146; Rapport of Combaldieu.
supra text accompanying note 160.
188. The variations on these stock phrases are relatively minor. See. e.g.. Conclustons of Advocate
General Flipo, Judgment of May 21, 1990, 1990 Bull. Civ. 1. No. 117. at 83. in 1990 ANN REP 129. 146
(1991) ("In the four cases that are today presented to you. we can only conclude in favor of the rejection
of the appeals .... ); Conclusions of Advocate General Bouyssic. Judgment of July 20. 1987. 1987 Bull.
Civ. I, No. 160-9, at 90, in 1987 ANN. REP. 24, 29 (1988) ('Consequently I conclude in favor of cassation
of this [lower court] decision on the basis of the first two branches of the claim.)
189. Rapport of Massip. supra note 183, at 471; see also Rapport of Massip. supra note 185. at 276
("Such are the different considerations that strike me as necessary to present to your Chamber before
rendering its decision on the appeal before iL").
190. This is the portion of the rapport that belongs to the author, and that he takes back once the case
has been decided by the Cour.
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Each dossier also contains one final set of documents produced by the
reporting judge: the projets d'arr~t.
The projets d'arrdt are drafts of judicial decisions, proposed by the
reporting judge to his brethren. There is nothing remarkable about any given
projet, but what is remarkable is that the reporting judge routinely produces
several projets for each case that the Cour handles. In important cases,' the
reporting judge traditionally produces at least two of them: one that would
serve as the basic model for a decision quashing the lower court decision, and
one for a decision rejecting the appeal. The reporting judge thus proposes at
least two projets leading to diametrically opposed results, each based on its
own legal grounds.'92 Furthermore, it is not unusual to come across dossiers
in which the reporting judge offers three or four projets, each premised on
different readings of different Code provisions, each stressing different aspects
of the case or different arguments raised by the parties, each leading to a
different-but possible and plausible-judicial response.
In a recent controversy, for example, the Cour de cassation handled several
appeals from appellate court decisions denying transsexuals the right to change
their sex on their official identity papers. After a lengthy discussion of the
issues, in which he argues in favor of quashing the appellate decisions, the
reporting justice concludes as follows:
In conclusion to these overly lengthy explanations, one should
recall that should the [Cour] desire not to reject the appeals, it would
have the choice of at least three formulas of quashing:
In the first case, the transsexual would be considered as belonging
to the sex of which he claims to be a member and of which he has
taken the appearance; this would be a complete assimilation.
A second solution could lead to the recognition of transsexualism
under only those conditions responding to the requirements of the
European Court in Strasbourg, thus giving only limited legal
protection to the interested parties.
Finally, as none of the delicate problems evoked in the previous
pages, notably with respect to marriage, have been directly raised by
the appeals, the Cour could deem the examination of these questions
premature and limit itself to ruling on what has been asked of it,
without otherwise deciding [on the other issues].'93
Given these closing remarks, one can be fairly certain that the reporting judge
has drafted at least four projets d'arr~t: one for each of the three "formulas of
191. Such cases come before the plenary sessions of the Cour ("Chambres mixtes" or "Assemblde
plniare").
192. See, e.g., unpublished rapport (on file with author) ("[D]epending on whether it accepts or not
[this] principle... the Plenary Assembly [of the Cour] will orient itself toward rejection of the appeal or
cassation. It is in this spirit that the two projets have been composed ....").
193. Rapport of Justice G6lineau-Larrivet, Judgment of Dec. 11, 1992, Cass. ass. pln., Bull. No. 13,
at 27, in 1992 ANN. REP. 67, 102 (1993).
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quashing" that he outlines above, and at least one more that would reject the
appeal."9 Each would be premised on different legal grounds.'95
The projet d'arr~t therefore represents the ultimate written manifestation
of the interpretive uncertainty of the French judiciary. For every important
decision that the Cour hands down, there remain in the Cour's dossier one or
more alternative decisions, each as formal, grammatical, and syllogistic as the
one actually rendered. In the archives of the Cour de cassation lie the
innumerable interpretive roads not taken. These projets d'arret are kept hidden.
Unlike rapports, of which a few examples-however heavily edited-may be
published in a given year, the projets d'arret never make their way out of the
Cour's internal dossiers.
2. The Magistrats' Framing of Legal Problems
Advocates general and reporting judges tend to perceive, construct, and
resolve legal controversies according to certain models. This Subsection offers
a basic typology of these models and explores their nuances."
a. The Legislative Gap
Contrary to what one might expect given the official portrait of the French
civil judge, it is not particularly unusual for conclusions or rapports to stress
the existence of legislative gaps. Indeed, one analytic mode characteristic of
published conclusions and rapports consists of openly framing the discussion
in terms of a perceived gap in the statutory law. The advocate general or the
reporting judge is then free to present her work as merely the construction of
a legal solution to this legislative insufficiency.
Take, for example, the transsexualism case discussed earlier. 9 In the
rapport, Reporting Justice G6lineau-Larrivet states that "the law gives
absolutely no directives" to the judges:'9 s "Although the statutory law
recognizes sexual difference, it gives absolutely no definition of sex .... "'
Thus, G61ineau-Larrivet frames his analysis of the relevant French legal texts
194. I regret that I am unable to state how many projets were actually produced in this particular case
I was allowed access to the Cour's dossiers precisely on the grounds that I was performing general research
on rapports and conclusions. It was made clear to me that I might well have been denied access had I
asked to study the dossiers of particular cases.
195. M. le Premier Prdsident Raymond Exertier of the Cour d'appel de Toulouse informed me that
his court had recently produced seven projets d'arr&t for a single case. Interview, in Toulouse. France (Mar
30, 1994).
196. The ensuing analysis is based overwhelmingly on published examples of conclusions and
rapports. The significance of their publication should not be underestimated: Published conchsions and
rapports tend to involve particularly controversial legal issues and arc therefore unlikely to be
representative of routine analyses performed by the Cour. See infra note 229 and accompanying text
197. See supra text accompanying note 193.
198. Rapport of G6lineau-Larrivet. supra note 193. at 67
199. Id. at 69.
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in the following terms: "The Legislative Problem[:] Except for the provisions
of the Penal Code punishing certain attacks on corporeal integrity-but is this
caveat even necessary?-the statutory law is silent in France." 2" Having
stressed the legislative gap,201 Reporting Justice Glineau-Larrivet not only
can, but must, look outside the statutory law in order to produce a legal
solution. The rapport stresses this as well, offering the following G6ny-esque
heading: "(Re)Search for a Solution."2 2
b. Applying/Interpreting Statutory Law
i. The Battle of Academic Doctrine
Although conclusions and rapports identify legislative gaps with some
frequency, it is more common for them to question how an existing legislative
provision should be applied or interpreted. A discussion of division within
doctrine-that is, within the ranks of legal scholars-is one of the prime
means by which conclusions and rapports introduce interpretive uncertainty.
By American standards, conclusions and rapports pay remarkable attention
to the opinions expressed by academics and legal commentators. The
importance of academic scholarship to the analysis produced by magistrats is
evidenced by the citation of numerous articles in support of a given
proposition:20 3 The standard published conclusions or rapport cites over a
dozen such articles, and it is by no means unusual for that number to be
doubled.
The advocate general or reporting judge may engage in a closer analysis
of doctrine, personalizing as well as summarizing a particular argument. Thus,
for example, Justice Massip notes:
As for Mme Rubellin-Devichi, her position has, it seems, evolved.
Although she considers associations for furthering surrogate
motherhood to be illicit, contrary to the statutory law and to good
morals, she wonders whether ignorance and systematic reprobation are
not more dangerous than resignation ... and whether it would not be
200. Id. at 80.
201. For an additional example of judicial notice of legislative silence, see Conclusions of Advocate
General Robert, Judgment of Nov. 24, 1989, in 1989 ANN. REP. 143 (1990) ("The question submitted to
your [Court] is that of the definition and of the legality of telephone wiretaps performed during the course
of a preliminary investigation .... No special text of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates these
investigatory procedures.").
202. Rapport of G6lineau-Larrivet, supra note 193, at 92. To the French jurist, the reference to Gdny
would be obvious. Gdny, after all, urged the judge to exercise "free scientific research" in order to
construct legal solutions when faced with legislative gaps. See supra text accompanying note 95.
203. See, e.g., Rapport of Massip, supra note 185, at 275 ("Legal doctrine is generally opposed to
surrogate parenting (See, in particular. Pierre Raynaud [citation]; Pierre Kayser [citation]; Alain S6riaux
[citation]; J. Rubellin-Devichi [citation]; Christian Atias [citation]; Malaurie and Ayn~s [citation]).").
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better to tolerate and regulate that which, in any case, one cannot
prevent.' °
This practice of summarizing and personalizing arguments from doctrine plays
an important discursive role in the composition of conclusions and rapports.
The tendency of advocates general and reporting judges to marshal strings of
citations of doctrine in support of given propositions takes on particular
importance when such strings of citations of doctrine are explicitly divided into
opposing camps. Indeed, conclusions and rapports frequently frame legal
issues in terms of "controversies within doctrine." In a typical example, Justice
Massip states:
This thesis [put forward by the appellant] joins the opinion
developed by a portion of doctrine with regard to the application of
[Articles 760 and 915 of the Civil Code]. [citation of three scholarly
articles].
For these authors ....
This point of view has not, however, gathered the adherence of
all authors. According to some ....
The idea that underlies this opinion is the same as the one
retained by [the lower courts] in this case ....
But this controversy within doctrine has been settled by a
decision of our Chamber on June 24, 1980 ....
On the other hand, the present affair poses another problem ....
On this point there also exists a controversy within doctrine.
a ) According to some ....
b ) But another mode of calculus has also been proposed ......
As this example demonstrates, the consideration of academic commentary
serves an extremely important function in the construction of the legal analysis
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Rapport of Massip, supra note 183. at 469-70.
The following conclusions offers a similar example:
As for the doctrine, it has expressed itself as well. pnncipally on the occasion of the
decisions that I have just recalled.
Mr. Malaurie ... is totally against the thesis proposed [by today's appeal]. Mr- ean
Savatier... as well. Mr. Henri Desbois... is similarly totally opposed
Mr. Rouast ... has a nuanced position ....
In the camp favorable to the granting of a cause of action, one finds Mr. Holleaux
The opinion of the Mazeauds is to be found in the following passages of their
Treatise ....
In the face of these opinions and contrary jurisprudence. what side will you take"
Conclusions of Advocate General Lindon, Judgment of May 20. 1969. Cass. civ Ire. 1969 D S Jur
429-30.
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of the advocate general and of the reporting judge. It is through the
presentation of controversy within doctrine that interpretive problems are
revealed. This method of presentation easily frames the discussion of how and
why a Code provision should be interpreted in a given fashion. The
controversy thus serves as a discursive device that both permits, and marks the
transition to, hermeneutic analysis.
Controversy within doctrine functions as a discursive device not only
because it permits-and even calls for-the magistrat to discuss different
hermeneutic approaches to a given interpretive problem, but also because it
tends to displace the source of the interpretive difficulty. By constructing an
interpretive problem as a controversy within doctrine, the magistrat identifies
legal commentary-rather than legislative text-as the locus of the interpretive
problem.
ii. The Doctrine of Jurisprudence
21e
The study of jurisprudence constitutes perhaps the prime function of
conclusions and rapports. The advocate general and reporting judge pay
extremely close attention to past judicial decisions, and the ways in which they
do so offer the best means of understanding the French judiciary's conception
of its own function.
A complete conclusions or rapport always cites and analyzes relevant
case law.20 7 Particularly pertinent judicial decisions tend to receive closer
attention. For example, after exposing different positions on doctrine, one
reporting justice states: "But this controversy within doctrine has been settled
by a decision of our Chamber on June 24, 1980. ... "08 He then goes on
to quote a portion of that decision. 209 The reporting judge presents the
precedent as possessing a certain normative force, as having "settled" a
controversy once and for all: "There is no doubt that this solution, brought out
with respect to Article 915 of the Civil Code, should also be applied in the
case of Article 760 .... We are therefore led to a quashing according to a
formula like that of the decision of 1980. ' The reference to, and quotation
of, the precedent does not serve merely to support the argument of the
reporting judge. The precedent forms the very basis of his proposed decision.
Advocates general and reporting judges typically frame their legal analyses
in terms of existing jurisprudence. After identifying and explaining the
206. The confusion produced by the unorthodox juxtaposition of doctrine and jurisprudence is quite
intentional, and shall be explained over the course of this Subsection.
207. I have not found a single conclusions or rapport that does not provide citations of previous
cases-i.e., of jurisprudence.
208. Rapport of Massip, supra note 185, at 469.
209. Id. at 470.
210. Id.
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jurisprudence, they focus on whether to apply, maintain, modify, or overturn
it. The rapport we have been examining, for instance, argues in favor of
"applying" a solution that the Cour had previously produced. In an inverted
version of the same basic approach, Justice Sargos offers the following
statement in one of his rapports: "We therefore cannot, it seems to me, apply
our jurisprudence on the inadmissibility of prejudicial questions that are raised
tardily." ''1 As such examples demonstrate, the framing of the conclusions or
rapport in terms of jurisprudence represents the displacement of the Code
from the center of the magistrat's analysis, and the establishment of the
normative force of judicial decisions in its place. The question is no longer
what the Code requires, but whether to apply a given jurisprudence.
The normative force inagistrats accord to an established line of judicial
decisions surfaces most clearly in those conclusions and rapports that argue
in favor of overturning a settled jurisprudence. Such arguments reveal that
judicial decisions can and do function as judicial regulations, or arrits de
r~glements.112 Let us consider a particularly vivid example:
The appeal submitted to you involves work-related accidents. The
precise question presented to you is that of the compensation of
victims of indirect harm from such an accident. In the current state of
the jurisprudence, such compensation is purely and simply
impossible-better yet-it is forbidden.
The norm on which you will base your decision offends the lower
courts....
But the lower court judges are not the only ones shocked by the
rule in question.[21 3] The doctrine also calls for its change ....
And, it seems to me,[21 11 there are among you those who
consider that the question is no longer whether the rule must change,
but to determine whether the change should come from the legislator
or from the jurisprudence.[2 5]
Several months ago you already considerably relaxed your
jurisprudence on a question that I would qualify as
"neighboring"....
The same extension should benefit today the victim of indirect
harm.
This overturning of jurisprudence is socially desirable. I do not
think it necessary to convince you of that. Definitely, the question that
you are invited to ask yourselves is whether, given that this
overturning is legally opportune, the reform should come from the
legislator or from jurisprudence?
211. Rapport of Sargos, supra note 185. at 573. 574.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 15. 41. 45
213. For analysis of the term "shocked." see infra text accompanying notes 242-43
214. For analysis of such personalization of arguments of the advocates general and reporting judges,
see infra text accompanying notes 251-55.
215. For analysis of institutional competence arguments. see mifra text accompanying notes 244-51
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From jurisprudence, I am convinced, and I will attempt to make
you share this conviction.
It is not the texts [of the statutory law], in effect, that command
refusing to Mrs. Rodriguez the reparation that the lower courts insist
on wanting to grant her; it is, to the contrary, the meaning that your
Cour has given them [the texts] at a given time in the law of tort
liability. But what jurisprudence has done, jurisprudence can
undo.2 16
This example demonstrates the full extent of the normative force of French
judicial decisions, as understood by a magistrat. The Cour, in giving meaning
to the legislative texts, has established a norm that commands certain results
and forbids others. There can be no question but that the Cour establishes
iterable rules.217
Of course, as this conclusions argues, the power to create implies the
power to destroy, or at least to change. This proposition only demonstrates the
extent to which magistrats (including sitting judges) are conscious of the
normative power of judicial decisions. The French judge deliberately controls
jurisprudence. The advocate general or reporting judge will thus research and
present the "state of the jurisprudence," framing her suggestions in terms of
it. When a court's line of decisions appears clear, the conclusions or rapport
will offer a statement along the following lines: "Your jurisprudence thus
emerges, clear, sharp, and as we noted earlier, constant. ' '218 Such a statement
does more than just make explicit the existence of a clearly delineated judicial
position. The use of the possessive pronoun "your" suggests the court's agency
and control.
The French court's power to control its jurisprudence deliberately, to
create and change its normative position on a given point of law, can give rise,
in conclusions and rapports, to detailed historical analyses of the development
and modification of judicial norms. The following passage, entitled "The
Evolution of the Jurisprudence," is drawn from a conclusions:
The first stage in the evolution took place in 1979 [citation] when
the First Civil Chamber [of the Cour] acknowledged that ....
More significant and more noticed, the second stage of the
evolution occurred a few years later when the First Chamber, on 29
216. Conclusions of Joinet, supra note 183, at 147-49.
217. Ernest Emmanuel Frank, Pr6sident de chambre honoraire A ]a Cour de cassation, goes so far as
to speak of "precedents" and "precedents from jurisprudence." Frank, L 'dlaboration des decisions ) la Cour
de cassation, 1983 Recueil Dalloz [D. Chron.] 119, 121-22. The notion of "judicial precedent" is totally
foreign to the official portrait of the civil judge, and the term is almost never used, even in unofficial
discourse.
218. Conclusions of Flipo, supra note 188, at 137. An unpublished conclusions (on file with author)




March 1984, and especially the Plenary Assembly [of the Cour], on
7 February 1986, decided that ....
It is therefore due above all to the initiative of the First Civil
Chamber that, in two strokes, the evolution desired by the [academic]
authors was produced.
In a first decision of 8 March 1988 ... the First Chamber
extended the field of contractual liability ....
But what was this foundation? ....
The answer was given by the First Chamber in another decision
of 21 June 1988, which explicitly bases itself ....
In 1988, the Cour did much more than take a step down an
already open path. It changed paths. Its decisions do not lie within the
line of previous jurisprudence. They are of a different nature.
The two decisions rendered in 1988 cannot be disassociated.
While the first sets out the principle-to which we shall return--of
"double limitation"-the second confers on the theory of group
contracts a spectacular power in positive law.219
This passage stresses the programmatic quality of the Cour's evolving
treatment of group contracts. That evolution is due "above all to the initiative
of the First Civil Chamber."2 ' Through the reversal of jurisprudence, it
results in a decision that "confers on the theory of group contracts a
spectacular power in positive law." The substantive question addressed by
the conclusions concerns whether the Cour's new jurisprudence should be
extended even further.
At times, conclusions and rapports seek-in a remarkably overt
fashion-to put to good use the programmatic and normative powers of French
judicial decisions. In the following example, the advocate general seeks to
convince the Cour to change its jurisprudence. After having addressed the
issues presented by an appeal and offered his proposed response, Advocate
General Lindon continues his conclusions:
But, having reached this point, one realizes that the problem starts
anew. It's that on the occasion of a Supreme Court decision, you
might be tempted to consider a problem akin to the one presented
today, the problem of the difference established by your decision of
13 January 1959 between the adulterine child to whom the law
accords the Article 342(2) action [for palimony), and the natural child
[born out of wedlock] to whom you refuse it.
219. Conclusions of Advocate General Mourier. Judgment of July 12. 1991. Bull. No. 5. at 7. in 1991
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Your position, as you know, is criticized.
It's in thinking of these [natural children] that I want to envisage
the eventuality of a change, on the occasion of your decision today,
of your jurisprudence.
To obtain this change, it would suffice for you to say, in the
heading of your decision, not that Article 342 cannot be invoked by
a legitimate child, but that it can only be invoked by an adulterine or
natural child. [222]
Finally, here is the third aspect of the problem, and it's not the
least important: by seeking to ameliorate the lot of natural children,
in connection with an appeal that only concerns a legitimate child,
you will go beyond the claim. But going beyond the claim is an
operation that the technique of our Cour condemns, in principle.
But then, one might ask: "Is it not appropriate to go beyond it?"
The answer is relatively easy when one considers the reason that
inspired the rule. This reason is that your role is to respect the limits
of the debate and to wait, in order to resolve a question, until it has
been presented to you. But precisely, the question of which we speak,
will anyone ever present it to you, or at any rate, will anyone present
it to you before a long time has passed? Since your decision of 1959,
there is no practitioner, be he of the most distant province, who does
not know that you refuse the benefit of Article 342(2) to natural
children.... One thus finds oneself in a vicious circle: if you do not
go beyond the claim, it will be a long time before an appeal offers
you the chance to rule on the applicability of Article 342(2) to natural
children, and if such an appeal is never submitted to you, how could
you make known your intention to go back on your 1959
jurisprudence?
Therefore, this leads me to think that it is worthwhile, if you wish
to make known that a natural child can henceforth invoke Article
342(2), to say it in your heading, even by going beyond the claim.
But that's not all. Your decision, the composition of your heading,
must not invite misunderstanding. And I would ask you, in this
regard, to take two precautions. First, to render your decision after
deliberation in counsel chambers, so that everybody knows perfectly
well that the formulation that you adopt is not the result of
inadvertence. And then, not to choose a discreet, padded
[formulation], as if you had misgivings about proclaiming what you
are doing, but to adopt a formulation that is clear and categorical; to
act in such a way that your decision be a signal and not a wink.223
222. The appeal was raised by a "legitimate" child born from adulterous relations but "legitimated"
by his legal father. Lindon is seeking to make Article 342(2)'s palimony action available to children born
out of wedlock ("natural" children), but to keep it unavailable to "legitimate" children born from adulterous
relations.
223. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 205, at 429, 430-32.
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In this passage, Lindon is trying to convince the Cour "to go back on" and "to
change" its rule of jurisprudence (established in a 1959 decision) forbidding
"natural" children from suing for palimony under Article 342(2) of the Civil
Code. In order to "improve the lot of natural children," Lindon asks the Cour
to permit such children "henceforth to invoke Article 342(2)."'
The problem-other than the rather unfortunate fact that the text of Article
342(2), at the time of the suit, only stated that its palimony action was
available to "children born from incestuous or adulterous relations"-is that the
appeal before the Cour has nothing to do with natural children; hence Lindon's
argument, which could simultaneously be termed "realistic" or "sophistic," that
the Cour should "go beyond the claim." Lindon, in short, is asking the Cour
to adopt a new stance on jurisprudence regarding Article 342(2), one that
would both permit and govern an entire new class of future cases. This is a
stunning argument, given the official portrait of the French civil judge.
"Establish this new, categorical and prospective rule," Lindon overtly argues,
"which will create and control a whole new cause of action, do so on the
occasion of this unrelated case, and in order to let it be known that you are
doing so intentionally, do so in the following fashion." The argument
succeeded: The Cour acted precisely as Lindon requested. The decision states
as its legal basis: "Given Article 342(2) of the Civil Code;-Whereas the
palimony action foreseen by this text can only be entertained if brought by a
natural, adulterine or incestuous child ...."L
3. Argumentative Modes
Once the legal problem is framed, how do French magistrats justify the
creation of a normative judicial solution? As this Subsection suggests,
conclusions and rapports tend to adopt one of a handful of modes of
argumentation.
To be sure, in the internal discourse of the French judicial system,
formalist exegesis of the Code remains a primary mode of legal argumentation.
Indeed, the mere existence of assorted hermeneutic methodologies within the
internal discourse of the French judicial system hardly implies that French
judges and academics believe that all legal problems are open to hermeneutic
analysis. The underlying assumption remains, as in mainstream French
academic doctrine, that hermeneutics only come into play when a grammatical
application of the statutory law fails to resolve the case at hand. 2 6 Good old-
fashioned grammatical analysis of codified legislative texts, that is, analysis
commonly associated with the nineteenth-century School of Exegesis, remains
224. Id at 431.
225. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
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the starting point-and quite often the ending point-of many conclusions and
rapports.2 2 7 Because so few conclusions and rapports are published,221 it
is reasonable to assume that those that are raise highly controversial legal
questions and thus offer a skewed picture of the internal discourse of the
French judicial system.229  Nonetheless, traces of straightforward
formalist/grammatical analysis are visible even in these conclusions and
rapports. Take, for example, Lindon's conclusions in the palimony action.230
Lindon's first argument is grammatical in orientation, focusing on the literal
text of the Code, and presenting its conclusion as the outcome compelled by
simple application of the traditional rules or canons of statutory
231construction.
Once conclusions and rapports move beyond the grammar traditionally
associated with the French judicial system, they tend to adopt particular
argumentative modes that are readily traceable to the primary concerns of the
mainstream academic theories introduced in Section A of Part IV. By far the
most common of these recurrent arguments are those based on the need for
legal adaptation and equity.
a. Legal Adaptation
The call for legal adaptation surfaces overtly in a large portion of
published conclusions and rapports. The following sentence, taken from the
final paragraph of a conclusions, offers an example: "[O]ne must 'return to the
fundamental concept that the supreme Cour is destined to control the exercise
of the role of legal adaptation by the courts.' 232 According to Advocate
227. The continued importance of formalist grammar is revealed by the basic structure of the
conclusions and rapports. These arguments, as I have already noted, almost always begin with a statement
of the statutory law.
228. The traditional French legal publications, furthermore, publish but a small percentage of official
judicial decisions. This holds true even for the Cour de cassation. Only those decisions that present "legal
interest" get published. For a brilliant analysis of the relation between the practice of legal publication and
the creation of judicial norms, see SERVERIN, supra note 73.
229. Access to the dossiers of the Cour de cassation hardly corrected this informational flaw. Thinking
they were doing me a favor, members of the Cour thought it would be helpful to present for my perusal
a selection of "particularly interesting"-as opposed, I am afraid, to particularly representative or
mundane--cases. I was never able, in fact, to convince the Cour that a "boring" breach of contract case
might be of greater interest to my study than a controversy considered sufficiently problematic to require
consideration by a Plenary Assembly of the Cour.
230. See supra note 223.
231. Id. The rules of traditional statutory construction closely resemble Friedrich Schleiermacher's
canons of grammatical interpretation. See Friedrich D. Schleiermacher, The Compendium of 1819 and the
Marginal Notes of 1828, in HERMENEUTICS: THE HANDWRrrrEN MANUSCRIPTS 95, 117 (Heinz Kimmerle
ed., 1977). Lindon's literalist argument, premised on the reading of Article 342 in the context of the
heading under which it is placed in the Civil Code, corresponds quite well, for instance, to Schleiermacher's
second canon of grammatical interpretation: "The meaning of each word of a passage must be determined
by the context in which it occurs." Id. at 127.
232. Conclusions of Advocate General Picca, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1987, Cass. soc., 1987 D. Jur. I ll,
113 (quoting Tunc, supra note 72).
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General Picca, the judicial adaptation of the law serves several essential
functions: "To abandon this mission, which constitutes the essential basis of
the role of a Cour, which regulates the law, would compromise both the unity
of the law and the security of the justiciable."'23 Judicial decisions, the
argument more often goes, should take into consideration the evolution of
modem society. Advocate General Dotenwille presents the argument in a
dramatic fashion:
Is he [Dotenwille] faithful to [Article 1384 of the Civil Code],
that will be for you supreme judges to judge, bearing in mind that he
who expresses himself has as a mission, with modesty, reserve and
prudence, to propose [Article 1384's] transposition to a world in
profound mutation ....
Does the general principle presented by Article 1384(1)...
authorize an adaptation to a changing society, which generates new
types of cases that its authors could never have imagined. .
I think that such a work of renewal is conceivable ....
I believe in a living law, and I believe in a certain audacity.[]
I conclude, faced with the future, in favor of rejecting the
appeal.
23
The law must change to keep up with the times, argues Advocate General
Dotenwille, and the judiciary should take part in that change. An unpublished
conclusions thus asks: "Have we not become the arbiters of the facts of our
society ... led by this very fact to forge ahead, which bothers certain jurists,
who, taking their time, are surprised by an evolution of the sources of the law,
an evolution off of which they nonetheless feed[?]"23'
Such arguments in favor of judicial adaptation of the law are of a
profoundly different nature than those underlying the official portrait of the
French civil judge. They are fundamentally hermeneutic; they call for the
interpretation of the statutory law on the basis of some theory of the role of
the judge and of the law in French society. The law and the judge serve a
vaguely defined social function. By fulfilling this function, they advance
certain basic policy objectives, such as "the unity of the law and the security
of the justiciable. '' 6 Judges, the argument concludes, must interpret the law
233. Id.
234. Conclusions of Advocate General Dotenwille, Judgment of Mar. 29. 1991. Bull No. 1. at I, in
1991 ANN. REP. 65, 66, 68, 93-94 (1992); see also unpublished conclusions ("In this case. it is a solutin
of rejection of the appeal that you will undoubtedly be brought to adopt. Such is the decision that I wish
to call for, my gaze turned toward the future.") (on file with author); unpublished conclusions ("Once again,
let us be of our own times.") (on file with author).
235. Unpublished conclusions (on file with author).
236. See supra text accompanying note 233.
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in terms of this function, and therefore give the law meaning in an ever-
changing society.
b. (In)Equity
Advocate General Joinet begins one of his conclusions as follows:
Your Plenary Assembly [of the Cour de cassation] is asked to
determine whether the time has come to fill a legal void-I mean by
this to put an end to a situation in which the disparity between the
norms and the "life" that they are supposed to govern is such that the
law can no longer fulfill its function of regulator, of bearer of
nonconflictual and equitable solutions to the difficulties of the
justiciable.
Should the law stray too far from reality, it would lose one of the
essential conditions of its legitimacy: that of being perceived as
acceptable by [those to whom it applies]. Rules that are too rigorous,
too unshakable in their logical purity, and that lead to socially absurd
situations are a menace to the credibility of the entire legal system to
which they belong.2
37
This opening passage constructs the same basic hermeneutic framework as that
offered by the legal adaptation arguments. Law serves a social function as
"regulator" and "bearer of ... equitable solutions." The exercise of these
functions advances certain fundamental policy objectives, including legitimacy
and acceptability. The judge must interpret law in terms of its function and
policy objectives to render it meaningful (i.e., not "socially absurd").238
The problem, as Joinet understands it, is that "the law [has] stray[ed] too
far from reality"-that a disparity exists between legal norms and the "'life'
that they are to govern." But the identification of this perceived departure,
which introduces the terms "life" and "reality" into the interpretive discussion,
represents a radical departure of its own-a departure from the text-centered
legal analysis and formalist grammar of the French judicial system. Something
external to the grammar of the legal text drives the analysis. That something
external is equity: "I have already invoked the human, social, and inequitable
consequences of this [rule]."2 39 The concept of equity, as utilized by French
magistrats, possesses positive value. It permits just and meaningful judicial
responses to legal controversies. But at the same time, it stands for a lack in
237. Conclusions of Joinet, supra note 183, at 147.
238. The following statement, objecting to a strict "exegetical" (French 19th-century formalist) reading
of a vague statute, is also instructive: "'Restoration of organic functions,' what is that if not everything, if
one sticks to [formalist] exegesis ... [?] But exegesis is not a one-way streetl If one remains attached to
the almost byzantine analysis of this phrase, we risk to slide toward the absurd." Unpublished conclusions
(on file with author).
239. Conclusions of Joinet, supra note 183, at 155.
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the grammar of the Code. Thus, equity serves to correct socially absurd results
produced by "rules that are too rigorous, too unshakable in their logical
purity."'  Equity therefore operates as a two-sided trope. It signifies that the
statutory law is not self-sufficient, due to its potential absurdity or
meaninglessness; it also stands for all that is external to the legal code, in
terms of which the statutory law should be read. The very notion of "equity"
posits a theory of the social function of the law: Law's "inside" (grammar)
must be responsive to its "outside" (social "life" or "reality"). Equity thus
posits the necessity of hermeneutic reading: the production of meaning on the
basis of a theory external to the grammar of the legal code. 24'
The transition to the hermeneutics of equity is typically supported by a
change in the tenor of the magistrat's argument. The magistrat adopts a more
personal tone, best described as righteous indignation.242 A French magistrat
will inevitably resort to the term "shocking" whenever he shifts to equity
argumentation. The following example offers a few variations on the theme:
"It would be morally unacceptable that .... Such a solution would be all the
more shocking in that .... It would simply be scandalous that .... That is
why the decision attacked here . . . appears tainted by a fundamental
inequity.' '243 The rhetoric of the "shock" marks the confrontation of the
grammar of the Code with the outside reality that equity represents. This
confrontation drives the magistrat into a more personal register, from which
he can respond as a social being rather than as a passive applicator of the
matrix of the Code. In this register, the magistrat (and thus the judiciary as a
whole) is personally shocked by the effects of the mechanical application of
a legal rule. The magistrat can and must affirmatively respond. He must
"intervene" to change the rule.
240. Id. at 148. The French magistrats' frequent turn to equity directly contradicts MeNryman's claim
that in civil law systems, judges only possess and exercise equity powers when the legislature has expressly
delegated such powers to them. See MERRYMAN. supra note 7. at 51-56.
241. It should be noted that "equity" thus serves as a free-floating signifier of all that is "outside- or
"external" to the grammar of the Code, and can be filled with just about anything. Most commonly.
"equity" concerns consist of various social and economic policy arguments. See. e.g.. Conclusions of Joinet.
supra note 183, at 148; Conclusions of Charbonnier. supra note 183. at 108.
242. [Ihe strict observation of this rule leads to results that. from the point of view of
humanity, from the point of view of equity, are extremely shocking....
And thus, in the current state of the law in the matter, parents are compelled
to submit the health of their child to the fate of a bet! Do I not have the right to use
the epithet "shocking" to describe such results?
Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 146.
243. Conclusions of Charbonnier. supra note 183. at 116-17; see also. e.g.. Conclusions of Joiner.
supra note 183, at 148 ("But the lower court judges are not the only ones shocked by the rule in
question.").
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c. Institutional Competence
When a conclusions or rapport discusses whether the judiciary should
intervene, its argument is framed in terms of institutional competence. There
are two primary issues. The first, and most frequently discussed, concerns the
allocation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. Given the
respective provinces of the legislature and of the judiciary, can the judiciary
establish a new solution to a given legal problem? The second issue, which
presupposes an affirmative answer to the previous question, concerns the
relative benefits of adopting a judicial-as opposed to a legislative-solution.
Should the judiciary construct the new solution, and if so, why?
The following example illustrates the traditional argument against the
formulation of a judicial solution. It is drawn from the first of two major cases
involving transsexualism handled by the Cour de cassation within the last four
years. Advocate General Flipo argues against judicial recognition of sex
changes:
Such problems cannot be resolved by jurisprudence. They can
only be [resolved] by the statutory law. Since the judge is the
guarantor of the statutory law, he must interpret it and not make it.
What is asked of you today, as is too often the case, is to go
beyond your role as the regulatory Cour, it is to take the place that
belongs to the legislator.
Many arguments are put forward to tempt you to attribute to
yourselves a privilege that is not yours....
. The judge must fulfill [his role], which is to apply the
statutory law. Let us leave to the legislator his own [role]. If he
wishes, as have other foreign States, to legislate on this matter, let
him do so and the statutory law that he will have made shall be
applied. But it is clear that you cannot and must not substitute
yourselves for him.244
Flipo's argument presents the classic, straightforward, and categorical argument
against judicial lawmaking. The judicial role consists of applying and
interpreting the statutory law. Making law is reserved for the legislator.
Resolving the problems raised by transsexualism would amount to judicial
usurpation of the legislative function.
The following conclusions offers a more nuanced position. Advocate
General Mourier states:
It is true that Article 1165 was better adapted to an individualist
civilization than to the social and economic relations of our time, and
244. Conclusions of Flipo, supra note 188, at 140-41.
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that it becomes more and more difficult to consider contracts in an
isolated fashion. Thus the legislator-by granting direct causes of
action-and the jurisprudence-by playing with various legal
mechanisms .... have greatly cut into the rule of the relativity of
contracts.
But this rule still exists, and the new interpretation, which must
be given to Article 1165 to generalize the mechanism of group
contracts, would this time entail putting [the rule of Article 1165] to
death, rather than producing another simple decline [in the rule]. It
might be preferable to let the legislator exercise a power that does not
belong to the judge. 45
This example presents a different image of the boundaries of the judiciary's
institutional competence. Mourier suggests that there exists a certain gray area
of acceptable judicial manipulation of a codified rule. He not only states that
the judiciary-for social and economic policy reasons-has in fact played with
Article 1165's rule, thus greatly cutting into it, he also seems to imply that
such behavior was and is permissible.2' The problem arises when the new
judicial interpretation, rather than simply causing a further erosion in the rule
(which would apparently be acceptable), would actually "put[ it] to death.-
24 7
The judiciary, Mourier suggests, is institutionally competent to perform limited
eviscerations of Code provisions, but should leave executions to the legislative
branch.248
In the Cour's second major case on transsexualism, Justice G6lineau-
Larrivet presents the following arguments to his peers:
A rejection of the appeals might compel the legislator to react. On
the other hand, the recognition of the legal effects of the transsexual
syndrome would permit the economy of a [legislative] text, which
physicians and the public authorities fear would produce, as in Italy,
a multiplication of requests for intervention.
Several considerations support the thesis of those who question
the utility of a legislative text....
-- On the theoretical level, it would be difficult for the legislator
to avoid problems of an ontological nature....
The parliamentary debates would lead to a questioning of sexual
identity .... Simple and objective criteria, on which rest the
declaration of sex at birth, might well be brought into question....
The legislator would also be confronted with the problems that
the recognition of transsexualism presents in the matters of marriage,
divorce, and filiation, with the risk of destabilization in this part of the
Civil Law....
245. Conclusions of Mourier, supra note 219. at 121.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. It is unclear whether Mourier's tentative turn of his final phrase (-It might be preferable-) is
sarcastic, understated, or sincere.
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-On the technical level: Until now, no definitive explanation has
been produced of the origin of transsexualism. The progress that will
come about on the issue could put into question the work of the
legislator, whereas the jurisprudence adapts faster.
-Finally, on the practical level, we have already evoked the
perverse effects of the legislative consecration of a phenomenon that
is, fortunately, marginal .... [249]
It is thus to the road of jurisprudence that one should turn."
As this section of Justice G6lineau-Larrivet's rapport demonstrates, the issue
is not whether the Cour can construct a new solution to the legal problem
posed by transsexualism. The debate does not center on the separation of
powers. The reporting justice assumes, without even bothering to explain why,
that the judiciary can assume the regulatory role that the legislature has
apparently hesitated to exercise, if doing so would be necessary and desirable.
Instead, the debate focuses on a question of institutional policy: whether the
Cour should construct the solution to the legal problem posed by
transsexualism. G6lineau-Larrivet turns to the benefits offered by a judicial-as
opposed to a legislative-solution. Framed as such, the institutional
competence discussion is transformed into the hermeneutics of policy
analysis.?5'
d. The Personalization of Unofficial French Judicial Discourse
In the largely hermeneutic field of conclusions and rapports, in which
French magistrats argue for or against the adoption, rejection, or application
of judicial norms on the basis of contested policy and equity considerations,
the civil judge does not speak as she does in her official judicial decisions. She
does not speak, to use Montesquieu's expression, as if she were "the mouth
that pronounces the words of the [statutory] law." 2
In her conclusions and rapports, the French magistrat always speaks in the
first person. She is a person distinguishable from the statutory law, one who
249. This sentence explicitly transposes the rhetoric of "perversion" from the sexual to the legal realm.
The conclusions in the previous transsexualism case merely left the judiciary's perverse adoption of the
legislator's role implicit. See supra text accompanying note 244.
250. Rapport of Gdlineau-Larrivet, supra note 193, at 80-81, 93.
251. Gdlineau-Larrivet analyzes whether it might not be better institutional policy to spare the
legislature embarrassing debates "of an ontological nature" and on a systemic level, to avoid "the risk of
destabilizing this part of the Civil Law." He questions whether it might not be better, given the fact that
" jurisprudence adapts itself faster [than legislation]," to adopt a judicial solution rather than run the risk
of having future medical breakthroughs "put into question the work of the legislator." On the level of social
policy, he asks if it might not be wise to avoid the production of a legislative text, that is, to avoid "the
legislative consecration of a phenomenon which is, fortunately, marginal," lest such a text "produce, as in
Italy, a multiplication" of the phenomenon, as "physicians and the public authorities fear." Id.
252. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 75, at 163.
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exercises agency and speaks in her own right. She-the "I"-has an opinion.
At the same time, the transition to the first person marks the loss of the
unquestioned (and unquestionable) authority of the statutory law; when the
judge speaks, she utters what is only an opinion. This loss of interpretive
authority surfaces in the language of the advocates general and of the reporting
judges. "The first claim... appears to me to call for a dismissal, but the
second ... leads, it seems to me, to reversal.25 3 The common use of such
qualifying personal interjections marks the magistrat's interpretive insecurity.
The language of the conclusions or rapport calls attention to the presence of
the magistrat, signaling a certain tentative quality to the argument. Statements
introduced by "it therefore appears preferable to me to answer that"' do not
exude a sense of interpretive necessity.25
The personalization of the magistrat's language represents its fallen,
relativized status: It is but opinion, but one option among many. The same
holds true for judicial decisions, whose authoritative status is undermined by
their personalization in the magistrats' arguments. The constant references to
"our [or your] jurisprudence" or to "our [or your] decision," while recognizing
the existence of normative judicial rules, simultaneously recognizes that the
jurisprudence in question is only "ours [or yours]," and that others do exist.
Hence the statement, "We therefore cannot, it seems to me, apply our
jurisprudence," sends out several messages. It affirms the existence of a
judicial norm capable of being applied, but it also expresses a certain hesitation
on the part of the magistrat as to whether it should be applied. Finally, it
suggests the relativized status of the norm; it is "ours," which may be different
than "theirs," and which therefore may not necessarily be the required rule.
After all, "we" produced it.
4. The Doctrine of the Cour
On December 10-11, 1993, a major conference took place in the Grand
Chamber of the Cour de cassation in Paris. Approximately thirty Justices,
advocates general, and legal academics presented papers at the conference,
253. Rapport of Sargos, supra note 185, at 573, 574 (emphasis added); see also. e.g.. id. at 573 ("he
above references will permit, it seems to me, the better understanding of the problems raised by the
appeal."); Rapport of Massip, supra note 183. at 469. 470 ("The answer should, besides. it seems to me.
be negative."); Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160. at 186 ("That is why I believe, as for me, that the
action of the concubine must be, in such a case, vigorously rejected.").
254. Rapport of Sargos, supra note 185. at 574.
255. French magistrats use several similar constructions, such as the use of third-person constructions,
"one can ask oneself if," "one can maintain that." or "'one can respond that"; or the use of the conditional
tense, "[tihere is a fourth consideration that could lead one to estimate that . . "See Rapport of Massip.
supra note 185, at 273, 274; see also. e.g., Conclusions of Mourier. supra note 219. at 116 ('If the
advantages of predictability do not strike me as determinative, I am. on the other hand. more sensitive to
the argument of judicial coherence invoked by the [academic) authors in favor of extension of the
contractual field.").
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entitled "The Doctrinal Image of the Cour de Cassation." The title appeared
to imply that there exist several images of what the Cour does-one of which
is academic, i.e., the image of doctrine. Given its title, one might have
expected the conference to address the disparity between this particular image
and, for instance, the Cour's image of itself. The speakers, however, did not
address the topic of images of the Cour, i.e., what such images consist of and
who produces them. Instead, the speakers all addressed the perennial problems
of French legal theory, inter alia, whether the Cour's decisions possess
normative value, whether they constitute part of France's positive law, and
whether they infringe on the separation of powers. The key word in the
conference's title was not "image" but "doctrine"; the participants constantly
referred to an expression that surfaces only rarely in French legal publications:
"the doctrine of the Cour." This expression, which has only recently slipped
into French legal discourse,256 accurately encapsulates the complex unofficial
portrait of the role of civil judge. On one important level, the expression is
nonsensical in terms of the official French portrait: Doctrine is what legal
commentators, not the courts, produce; and because the courts only apply the
statutory law, they cannot create judicial doctrine (in the common law sense
of "Supreme Court doctrine"). But on another level, the expression accurately
conveys the primary characteristics of the French civil courts (especially the
Cour de cassation), as depicted in the unofficial French portrait.
Understanding what is in play on this second level requires sensitivity to
the now-double connotation of the term "doctrine." Another meaning has been
added to its traditional connotation: an authoritative judicial position governing
a given legal issue. This alternative meaning, relatively unproblematic to the
American jurist, runs counter to the entire official French portrait of the civil
judge. It is indeed difficult to square the following statement, "the [Cour de
cassation] proclaims its [judicial] doctrine and, when necessary, imposes
it, '' 1 7 with the prohibition, stated in Article 5 of the Civil Code, against
"general" and "regulatory" judicial pronouncements. And yet, as we have seen
in the conclusions and rapports, French jurisprudence clearly possesses
enormous normative power; the Cour indeed "proclaims its doctrine and, when
necessary, imposes it.
' '258
This observation does not end the matter. The original meaning of the term
"doctrine" has not been altogether lost, even in the expression "the doctrine
of the Cour." The term retains a resonance of commentary, of opinion, of
taking a stand in the legal academics' controverted field of multiple and
conflicting interpretive possibilities. The term retains the resonance of the
256. See, e.g., Andr6 Perdriau, La portie doctrinale des arr~ts civils de la Cour de cassation [The
Doctrinal Impact of the Cour de cassation's Civil Judgments], in 1990 ANN. REP. 59 (1991).
257. Id. at 61.
258. Id.
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expression "controversy within doctrine."'29 The expression "the doctrine of
the Cour," just as the expression "our [or )'our] jurisprudence," thus signifies
a certain personalization of the Cour; the Cour is but one position taker among
many.
26
The insertion of the Cour's judicial doctrine into the controverted academic
field of debate within doctrine manifests itself, in the conclusions and
rapports, as the magistrat's keen awareness of academic doctrine's reception
of the Cour's judicial doctrine. The advocate general or the reporting judge
will sometimes relate the positive reception of jurisprudence among legal
commentators7 61 More often, however, the magistrat will support his
argument for a change in the Cour's jurisprudence with an introductory
sentence along the following lines: "Your position, as you know, is
criticized. ''262 This example demonstrates the personalization of the Cour's
jurisprudence,26' as well as its reduction to a mere position, and one that is
criticized at that.264 The French magistrat is aware that he is taking a
position in the field of debate within doctrine. He is therefore sensitive to the
future reception of new judicial doctrine, as this final example demonstrates:
[I]f you extend the benefits of Article 342(2), ... you will expose
yourselves to reproaches of contradiction; because here is, and I'm
playing the role of devil's advocate, what they will be able to say to
you...; but then, will they say ....
You want, will they say as well ....
Finally, they will say ....
The French judge, in establishing judicial doctrine, has become personally
answerable to "them," that is, to academic doctrine. His normative power to
establish judicial doctrine has been acquired at the price of agency ("you
want").
266
The unofficial French portrait of the civil judge, as encapsulated in the
expression "the doctrine of the Cour," presents the judge as exercising an
259. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
260. The passage of the French judge into the field of doctrine is perhaps best exemplified by a
relatively recent phenomenon. In particular, it has become not uncommon for a reporting judge to have
portions of his rapport published as the case "note" (case comment) immediately following the text of the
Cour's decision. For a recent example, see Judgment of Jan. 6. 1994. Cass. ass. pldn.. 1994 Bull Civ. I.
No. 382 note Renard-Payen.
261. See, e.g., Conclusions of Bouyssic. supra note 188. at 26 ("This jurisprudence, very favorable
to the victim, is generally approved.").
262. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 205, at 429, 430.
263. Premier President Exertier's remark "I must maintain myjursprudence" is once again pertinent.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
264. Note the subtle difference in the way 'approved" and '*cnticzed" judicial "doctrine" is presented.
When "approved," it is termed "this jurisprudence"; when criticized, it is termed "Your position."
265. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 205. at 431.
266. The following statement in an unpublished rapport also illustrates the point: "Finally, if %kc want
to bend the jurisprudence .... (on file with author).
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interpretive practice that cannot simply be termed grammatical. Statutory law
can no longer be understood as the generative matrix of all French judicial
decisions. Whether he is regarded as establishing normative judicial doctrine,
or as partaking in the conflict of opinions within doctrine, or both, the agency
of the French civil judge has been intercalated between statutory law and
judicial decisions.
267
5. Of Judges, Automobiles, and Article 1384 of the Civil Code
To the French jurist, the judiciary's contribution to the law of civil liability
represents the clearest example of the civil judge's power to create law. As has
often been remarked, the French judiciary has constructed almost all of modern
French tort law on the basis of a mere five articles of the Civil Code.2 61 The
following conclusions, from a tort case involving a traffic accident, illustrates
almost all the elements analyzed in this Part:
The judges had, in this affair, to apply a classic text [Article
1384(1) of the Civil Code[269] to a situation that is no less classic
(an accident involving pedestrians hit by an automobile while crossing
a street).
And yet what difficulties in arriving at the solution to the problem
of liability! Objections, replies, contradictory decisions and, in the
end, the supreme Cour is called upon[ ]. Perhaps the present case will
be for us the occasion to put our finger on one of the causes of these
complications.
The lower court judges had found the victims negligent in two
respects .... And the judges had considered, by way of a manifestly
erroneous determination, that for the driver this behavior had been of
a character both unforeseeable and unavoidable, of a nature to
exonerate him of the liability rightfully resting on him by virtue of
[Article 1384].
The appellate court, for its part, reversed the solution and judged
the driver alone liable.
Is the truth not somewhere between these two extremes, at some
mean viewed as golden?[ 270] In reality, should it not have been
decided that the driver of the vehicle was at least partially exonerated
267. See also Rapport of G6lineau-Larrivet, supra note 193, at 102 ("[Olnc should recall that should
the [Cour] desire not to reject the appeals, it would have the choice between at least three formulas of
cassation.").
268. See C. civ. arts. 1382-86; see also Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act
of Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (1988). Merryman incorrectly
suggests that the French body of tort law springs only from Article 1382. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7,
at 56.
269. "One is responsible not only for the damage that one causes by one's own act, but also for that
which is caused by the act of persons for whom one must answer, or of things that one has under one's
custodianship." C. ctv. art. 1384(l).
270. The French original refers to "tin milieu... r~putijuste," a phrase that simultaneously evokes
the expression "lejuste milieu" (the golden mean) and the idea of justice.
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of his liability by the faults of the victims, even though [the victims'
behavior was] neither unforeseeable nor unavoidable?
But the appellate court remained silent on the second fault
imputed to the victims: the absence of precautions in crossing the
road ....
Reversal therefore seems in the logic of the principles.
This case, however, leads us to question the value, fundamentally,
of such a solution.
The necessity of responding to the argument of the driver was
evident and the appellate court ... could not have failed to be
conscious of it.
But the difficulty in responding was great and it appears that,
rather than give in to the argument, the appellate judges evaded the
obstacle.
Why then this reaction? No doubt because they considered it
equitable to ensure that the victims of this accident receive total
reparations and because taking into account the defense's objection
would have led them to grant but a partial reparation.
Such anattitude, often observed, warrants our attention.
Is it not a sign of a tension, at the level of the application of the
legal rule, between the substance of this rule and the demands of
justice, such as they are currently felt?
And if such is the case, if the legal principle does not engender
the just solution, then because in this case the principle is one of
jurisprudence, because it is you who established it, you are the
masters of it and you can change it.
I propose that to reconsider this subject, one must start far back,
because the principle in question-that of the partial exoneration of
the custodian of an object by [the foreseeable or unavoidable] fault of
the victim-is integrated in a whole from which it should not be
removed unless it does not occupy a logical and necessary place.
At the heart of the idea of liability, one finds the idea of fault.
They are inseparable from each other, for man is so made that he
does not accept that a damage be imputed to him if some failure of
comportment does not appear at the origin of the damage. It is a
question here of a primary, profound, and irreducible sentiment, which
is none other than the sentiment of justice.
Dean Carbonnier has expressed it remarkably:
"The harm having been produced, a voice questions man: who did
it? what did you do? A man must answer before his conscience-this
is moral responsibility; before the law, it is legal liability."
But this link between fault and liability produces bilateral
consequences. If fault is the measure of liability, then when a victim
has himself taken part in his own damage, how can one justify not
leaving to him a corresponding portion of his prejudice?
If the tortfeasor had to pay this portion, it would be unjust. Justice
demands that one pay what one owes, all that one owes, but only
what one owes.
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This principle, as old as the law, has constituted to our times a
sort of "fundamental principle" of liability.
It is nonetheless put into question by the evolution of modem
society.
This evolution, which has taken the character of an upheaval, has
had basically two causes: the emergence of a technique and a change
in mind-set.
1.-The new technique is that of insurance, and by its widespread
use, it has played a fundamental role. It has radically transformed the
fate of the civilly liable. In civil terms, . . however great may be the
gravity of the fault or the magnitude of the damage, it is no longer the
author of the accident who personally bears its consequences. In every
case, the party found liable risks financially but a momentary and
forfeitary increase in his insurance premium. His daily life will not
even be disturbed by the legal sequel of the accident, for in general
the insurer provides for his defense. One therefore notes, on the side
of the authors [of the accidents], a general leveling of situations into
a kind of rationalized comfort.
On the side of the victims, on the other hand, essentially nothing
has changed. To be sure, he who has lost an arm or an eye is certain
to receive compensation, but he remains without the arm or without
the eye. When he hasn't lost his life[ ].
The disequilibrium that has thus appeared in the respective
situations of the tortfeasors and the victims has often been noted by
liability specialists. See, in particular, on this subject, the strong
remarks of Professor Tunc ....
2.-This change in situations has led to a modification of
sensibilities.
Since the tortfeasor is practically no longer affected by the
consequences of his act, and since the insurer assuredly is no more so
(because he adjusts premiums according to risks), attention now
focuses on the victim. And in a world dominated notably by the
values-sometimes contradictory-of individual happiness and social
solidarity, our contemporaries have a tendency to sympathize more
with the fate of the victims and to wish that they receive a more
complete reparation, even if, by their own failure, they may have
contributed to their own damage.
It is up to us to take account of this fundamental upheaval of the
traditional premises of the problem of liability, and we are in a
position, as technicians, to seize its exact measure.
1.-Because, in our current society .... accidents have multi-
plied to the point of becoming a national plague, and the courts have
been brought, under your control, in order to assure insofar as
possible the reparation of damages, to measure fault in an increasingly
rigorous fashion. So that now, what is required of each of us is to
behave not only as "a good family father," but as a perfect man. The
judge measures human conduct in terms of an abstract ideal, and what
incurs liability is, finally, a lack of perfection.
A criterion that leaves the tortfeasor indifferent (and we have seen
why), but that turns against the victim.
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And [against] all victims-children, the aged, people more or less
handicapped-because the jurisprudence is such that one does not ask
whether it was actually possible for them to attain the required
behavioral ideal.
Thus a slight fault, in the abstract, of the victim, weighed against
a similar fault of the author, will lead to the cutting in half of the
liability. So that if, for example, the prejudice to the victim is of
100,000 francs, he will receive but half of this sum. His fault will
have thus cost 50,000 francs, while that of the tortfeasor, while equal,
will remain for him practically devoid of monetary consequences[ 1.
2.-This disparity is all the more shocking in that the penalty that
thus strikes the victim because of his fault is in general out of all
relation to the severity of the fault.
Is it just, in these conditions, to deprive the victim of a portion of
his reparation because of his fault?
One could so argue in days of old, when the author [of the
accident] was on the same plane as the victim and had to assume,
personally and materially, the consequences of his act. It was normal,
then, that each bear the weight of his failures. But in our times, the
ancient equilibrium has been broken: The author is no longer
penalized for his conduct.
Why should the victim remain so?
The preceding considerations are of general value. But they are
obviously destined to remain without practical consequence, on the
level of jurisprudence, in the area of liability for fault per se,
governed by C. Civ. arts. 1382, 1383. The principles being what they
are, it does not appear possible to put aside the traditional solutions.
But such is not the case for liability for the acts of objects, such
as has been organized by the jurisprudence based on Article 1384(1).
1.-I will not attempt to settle here the theoretical debate, opened
half a century ago and not yet closed, concerning the nature of this
liability.
It has, as you know, divided the best minds, some maintaining
that the system of liability that flows from the famous decision
rendered by the Plenary Assembly [of the Cour de cassation] in the
Jand'heur case of 13 Feb. 1930, remains finally founded on fault,
because there has been "fault in the custodianship" [citation to a
French legal treatise], others maintaining to the contrary that, since it
excludes the search for fault, the system presents a purely objective
character.
This latter thesis is obviously very favorable to the demonstration
that I intend to conduct. Mrs. Lambert-Faivre exactly perceived, from
the point of view that interests us, its logical implications:
. . . "It is up to the Cour de cassation to go to the end of this
evolution by consecrating, in traffic cases, the principle of objective
and causal liability, to which the only exception would be external
causes having the character of force majeure and marking the rupture
of the causal link." ...
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Those of you won over to the idea of the objective character of
liability under Article 1384(1) will be convinced by this reasoning
alone.
Others perhaps will require, like me, further arguments.
I therefore think, insofar as I am concerned, that it is better to
stay away from rigid statements on the nature of liability under
Article 1384(1). If one wishes to grasp closely the realities, and also
by consequence the language, it would be appropriate, it seems to me,
to say that [it has both objective and subjective elements].
2.-In reality, what is essential in the system descended from the
dispositions of Article 1384(1), what differentiates it fundamentally,
is that it places on the custodian a "presumption of liability."
And this presumption offers an immense and double advantage
for the victim: it reverses to his benefit the burden of proof, and it
does so with great force, because the custodian can only free himself
of it by proving that the damage was in reality due to an act of force
majeure, both unforeseeable and unavoidable.
Such is, in its original purity, the doctrine of the Jand'heur
decision.
But very rapidly .... under the influence of that old and profound
idea that fault must be the measure of liability, another jurisprudence
manifested itself-which has not been without twists and turns and
detours, but which progressively imposed itself-according to which
the fault of the victim, even if foreseeable or avoidable, was of a
nature to exonerate partially the custodian of his liability.
So that of the two advantages for victims resulting from the 1930
decision, only the first subsisted (the shift of the burden of proof), the
second disappearing to be replaced, as in ordinary matters, by a
sharing of liability between tortfeasor and victim ....
3.-This situation worsened, starting in 1961, due to a series of
decisions of the Second Civil Chamber, which then declared partially
exoneratory the [faultless] act of the victim, when it does not present
the characteristics of unforeseeability and unavoidability.
This rule was certainly erroneous, and I have been waiting for an
occasion to ask you to abandon it.
I know perfectly well that at that time the Cour was under the
influence of the doctrine of the Lamoricikre decision, . . . which
admitted the possibility of the tortfeasor's partial exoneration by an
external event (in that case, a storm). But when, in 1970 .... the
Second Chamber revisited this jurisprudence, the rule of partial
exoneration by the [faultless] act of the victim fell of its own and
should logically have been abandoned.
4.-As for [an approach permitting] the partial exoneration of the
tortfeasor by the negligence of the victim, one must recognize that, in
the purely rational order, nothing requires its abandonment.
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It would only be otherwise if the system of liability under Article
1384(1) could be considered as purely objective in nature, entirely
independent of the idea of fault.
But although, in my opinion, the rule in question is not logically
condemned by the current system, it is equally true, on the other
hand, that this system does not necessarily imply it either.
It [the rule in question] could just as well have been imposed as
not. That depended on the force that one intended to confer on the
presumption of liability weighing on the custodian of the object.
In the beginning, the proof of an act of force majeure was
required in every case. Later-motivated by the idea, which was then
profoundly just, that the victim must, like the author, bear the burden
of his faults-the Cour de cassation relaxed its initial rigor and
admitted partial exoneration.
But the traditional premises have been overturned, so that this
solution finds itself essentially deprived of its initial justification,
while new moral demands make its suppression appear desirable.
In short, the rule in question was formulated in another era for
reasons of equity, and paradoxically, it is today for reasons of equity
that it would be appropriate, it seems to me, to revoke it.
By so doing, you would illustrate by way of a remarkable
example the regulatory function of the Supreme Cour.
It is important however to ask preliminarily whether, alongside
the advantages to be derived from this reversal of jurisprudence, there
might not also result certain inconveniences that would detract from
it.
1.-It is certain that the envisaged change would engender a
disparity of treatment among victims, depending on whether Article
1384(1) or 1382 is applied to them.
And in any case, it is not because it is impossible, in one
decision, to advance all of liability law that you must abstain from
improving it, without further delay, insofar as it is in your power to
do so.
You may also be in a position to facilitate the work of the
legislator.
2.-The total indemnification of the victim, even in the case of
fault on his part, is rendered possible thanks to insurance, which,
besides, has become largely obligatory, especially for motor vehicles.
But cases will arise where, insurance being optional, the author
of a damage will not be insured and where, therefore, the old situation
will persist.
Cases of this sort should become increasingly rare, not only
because coverage for civil liability is becoming more widespread, but
also because insurance companies now tend to include this risk
automatically in their fire policies.
Besides, to the extent that the courts should find themselves
confronted by painful situations, because of the lack of insurance, they
would be free, if not to split the liability [between author and victim],
to adjust according to equity the damages imposed on the author.
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3.-The total indemnification of victims would obviously lead to
an increase in the costs of insurance companies, and thus to a
generalized rise in premiums.
It is difficult to measure the effort of solidarity that would thus
be asked of most of our fellow citizens. If it should appear excessive,
it will be up to the legislator to intervene.
I consider, insofar as I am concerned, that it is not possible for us,
given the state of things, confronted by the knowledge of the unjust
consequences of a rule of jurisprudence, to allow this rule to subsist.
One can also note that the supplementary sums paid by the
insurers would, in large part, be recuperated by the national health
care system.
4.-The adoption of the new rule would necessarily lead to the
decline of certain subsidiary [judicial] solutions ....
No objection could be raised against abandoning these two
jurisprudences, which would be the logical consequence of the newly
established rule and which would also serve the interests of victims.
It would represent, furthermore, a significant simplification of
liability law.
One must well recognize, on this level, that the suppression of the
comparative negligence rule would have a considerable impact. This
would be-besides the interest of justice, which is alone
decisive-one of the major advantages of the desired overturning of
the jurisprudence.
All sharing of liability having been eliminated, the interminable
discussions of lawyers on this question would be eliminated in one
shot. The debates would be clarified and simplified, the procedure
disencumbered and expedited.
Dean Carbonnier perceived very well the unpleasant consequences
engendered by the case law's comparative negligence rule:
[Carbonnier laments the loss of "quasi-automatic functioning" of tort
cases after the Jand'heur decision's introduction of the comparative
negligence rule.]
Well, sirs! Remove the comparative negligence rule and you will
realize the rare alliance of justice and efficacy!27'
This argument contains virtually every element characteristic of unofficial
French judicial discourse, including controversy within doctrine, detailed
analysis of the norms of jurisprudence, equity considerations, legal adaptation
arguments, institutional competence discussions, social and economic policy
considerations, and highly personalized expression. Dawson's criticisms of the
French judicial system seem less convincing in the face of such an example.
Let us begin this final analysis by examining the interpretive method of
Charbonnier, the author of the above conclusions. He starts his argument by
271. Conclusions of Advocate General Charbonnier, Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, 1982
D.S. Jur. 449-52 (citations omitted).
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stating that "[t]he judges had, in this affair, to apply a classic text [Article
1384(1) of the Civil Code] to a situation that is no less classic."2-'  Such a
statement is consistent with the official portrait's depiction of grammatical
judicial interpretation; the judge applies a given text of the Code.
Charbonnier's argument, however, offers little pretense of the Code's analytic
centrality. The text of Article 1384(1) is never seriously discussed, much less
quoted. The interpretive discussion does not turn on the application of the
Code provision, but on whether or not a particular judicial rule should be
maintained. Charbonnier emphasizes the judicial origin of the rule; it is a rule
of jurisprudence, descended from a long line of judicial decisions dating back
to the 1930 Jand'heur decision.
The parameters thus established imply the abandonment of the traditional
grammar of the official French portrait; the formally controlling text has been
entirely displaced by judicial norms. It is no longer the Code that generates the
judicial solution. Furthermore, the mere existence of a controlling rule of
jurisprudence signifies the failure of the grammar of the Code. If the grammar
of the Code were functioning, there would be no room-never mind the
need-for a judicial rule to be established in the first place. In order for the
judiciary to interpose a rule of jurisprudence between the Code and the
solution, grammar must have been perceived to have failed to generate a
required interpretive path. Thus, Charbonnier states that the judicial rule "could
just as well have been imposed as not.
273
The interpretive method of Charbonnier's conclusions places itself on the
hermeneutic plane. Charbonnier seeks to arrive at a meaningful judicial
solution on the basis of considerations that, though external to the grammar of
the Code, are deemed pertinent to the resolution of the case. In this search,
there is much room for discussion about why a given judicial position should
be adopted.274
Charbonnier's conclusions therefore presents a plethora of policy
arguments. He advances social policy arguments, economic policy
arguments, 76  administrative efficiency arguments,2" and, of course,
institutional arguments. The last are of particular importance; they reflect
272. Id.
273. Id.; see also unpublished conclusions (on file with author) ("[Article 5111 authorizes several
approaches that-why hide it?-divide [the Chambers of] our Supreme Cour .... ").
274. Charbonnier discusses, inter alia, the evolution of modem society, the effects of insurance, the
shocking inequities of these effects, the doctrine of the Jand'heur decision, the justification of given
jurisprudential rules, the social, economic, and legal effects produced by the adoption of different judicial
norms, and the change in the mind-set of contemporaries. Conclusions of Charbonmer, supra note 271. at
449-51.
275. Id. at 450 (noting that "social solidarity" should protect victims of accidents. regardless of
victims' fault).
276. Id. (noting that total indemnification of victims will increase costs of insurance companies, and
thus cost of premiums, but will decrease costs of social security, which in France includes nationalized
health care).
277. Id. (noting that new rule would, for instance. "disencumber and expedite" legal procedure).
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directly on the perceived role of the judiciary. Charbonnier's conclusions
offers, on the issue of institutional competence, several arguments. The most
explicit is that judges possess the power to posit normative rules, to establish
doctrines, and to change them.278 To Charbonnier, the normative power of
the French civil judge is an absolute given.
Charbonnier debates whether judges should exercise that power in this
particular case, and he answers affirmatively. 279 It is up to French judges to
adapt the law to the evolution of modern society, even if, in this particular
case, such judicial adaptation only concerns a portion of liability law. As so
conceived, the sphere of appropriate judicial action is hardly distinct from that
of the legislator.280 The judge and the legislator are clearly operating in
closely related spheres; the judge establishes new rules, but the legislature can
build upon or overturn them. The normative power of the civil judge, as
understood by Charbonnier, is enormous: He can establish judicial rules that
will cover all future cases in a given legal field.28'
Charbonnier's consideration of the impact of his proposed new rule of
jurisprudence is a discursive maneuver permitting him to turn to practical
economic and social "realities," rather than focusing on the controlling legal
text. He therefore discusses the pecuniary effects of applying the old rule.
282
Implicit in this discursive stance is a critique of "abstract" and "formalist"
reading, which limits itself to purely textual analysis. The problem is that
"[t]he judge measures human conduct in terms of an abstract ideal., 28" To
Charbonnier, if one were "to grasp closely the realities," one would also, "by
consequence," grasp "the language."2' 4
Charbonnier's focus on impact and "realities" displaces the controlling
legal text"s5 on the basis of a critique of abstract reading, and opens the
requisite textual space for the ensuing policy analysis. The conclusions thus
constructs an interpretive framework in which the role of the French civil
judge has been profoundly modified. The judge is now in a position to adopt
a new, sweeping, and overtly programmatic stance on the basis of its
advantages and inconveniences. In this new interpretive construct, French
278. Id. at 449 ("[Blecause in this case the principle is one of jurisprudence, because it is you who
established it, you are the masters of it and you can change it.").
279. Id. at 450 ("It is up to us to take account of this fundamental upheaval of the traditional premises
of the problem of liability, and we are in a position, as technicians, to seize its exact measure.").
280. Charbonnier argues that establishing a new judicial rule, though it would only affect a portion
of liability law, might "facilitate the work of the legislator." If its economic effects "should appear
excessive, it will be up to the legislator to intervene." Id. at 451-52.
281. Id. at 452 (arguing that "the considerable impact" of new judicial stance would actually constitute
"one of its major advantages").
282. Id. at 450 (noting that fault of some poor victim will "cost him 50,000 francs" in reparations;
"children, the aged, [and] people more or less handicapped" face similar perils).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 451.
285. One could argue about which text is actually controlling at this point: Is it still Article 1384(f),
or is it jurisprudence's comparative negligence rule?
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magistrats, arguing among themselves, can actually "question the value,
fundamentally, of [the solution suggested by the logic of the textual
'principles' '." 286 There can be little doubt as to the hermeneutic nature of
such a statement. The "value" can only be measured in terms external to the
Code, be they philosophical, sociological, economic, or political in nature.
In this hermeneutic framework, the French civil judge is no longer the
passive agent who merely applies the grammar of the Code. He is an active
agent intercalated between the Code and the "appropriate" or "desirable"--to
use Charbonnier's terms-judicial solution. He can be "won over" to one or
another of doctrine's positions, and can be "convinced," via policy
argumentation, to act. "[B]ecause in this case the principle is one of
jurisprudence, because it is you who established it, you are the masters of it
and you can change it.... It is up to us to take account of this fundamental
upheaval of the traditional premises of the problem of liability."2"
Charbonnier's argument seeks to force the judges of the Cour to
recognize-and take responsibility for-the consequences of their past and
present interpretations, of their rules of jurisprudence. His language personally
implicates the judges. Enough of the "ventriloquism" of which Dawson
correctly speaks;2ss the judge is not merely the passive mouth of the statutory
law. Charbonnier invites his fellow magistrats to join him in the first-person
singular.8 9
The judges of the Cour were apparently receptive to Charbonnier's
conclusions. They overturned their jurisprudence, albeit in the traditional
manner. After describing the facts and procedural history of the case, the Cour
states in its official decision:
[W]hereas only an event constituting a case of force majeure
exonerates the custodian of an object, instrument of the damage, of
the liability borne by him by virtue of the application of Article
1384(1) of the Civil Code; whereas, consequently, the conduct of the
victim, if it was not unforeseeable and unavoidable for the custodian,
cannot exonerate him, even partially; whereas [the victim's conduct
here was neither unforeseeable nor such as to result inevitably in the
accident];
On these grounds, rejects the appeal ....
286. Conclusions of Charbonnier, supra note 271, at 450.
287. Id. at 449-50 (emphases added); see also id. at 452 ("1 consider, insofar as I am concerned, that
it is not possible for us, given the state of things, confronted by the knowledge of the unjust consequences
of a rule of jurisprudence, to allow this rule to subsist.").
288. See supra text accompanying note 28.
289. "My speech is clear, undoubtedly a little rough, direct; lit] doesn't wrap itself up in padded terms
which make of Justice-nd it's a mistake to do so-a world apart." Unpublished conclusions (on file with
author). The move to the first person singular, which both empowers and relativizes the judge, is related
to the switch to hermeneutic reading: It marks the breaking of the textual insularity of the law
290. Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e 1982 D.S. Jur. at 452.
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The official portrait of the French civil judge is carefully maintained: The
decision conveys the classic image of the passive French judge, mechanically
applying the grammar of the Code. Only someone already familiar with the
internal discourse of the French judicial system would recognize the elaborate
hermeneutics that went into those two simple words: "even partially."
V. THE RELATION BETwEEN THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL PORTRAITS
This analysis of French judicial discourse suggests several conclusions.
The first is that while Dawson's influential analysis of the French civil judicial
system is highly suggestive, it is nonetheless misleading, if not incorrect. The
rigid, formalist conception of adjudication, which Dawson describes so
well-and which I have termed the "official French portrait" of the civil
judge--does not dominate the French civil law system.
This conclusion hinges on an examination of the various elements that
constitute the unofficial French portrait: French academic doctrine, the
conclusions of the advocates general, and the rapports of the reporting judges.
Even the most cursory analysis of these sources reveals the existence of a
vibrant and contested institutional and discursive sphere in which French
academics and judicial magistrats seek to produce coherent policy-based
judicial responses to contemporary legal problems. In this sphere, the French
civil magistrat deemphasizes the formal wording of statutory law and engages
instead in policy analysis. In this discursive mode, the French judge bases her
legal reasoning and conclusions on, inter alia, social and economic policy
considerations, institutional competence issues, and equity arguments. In this
hermeneutic framework, the French judge deliberately establishes judicial
norms or rules of jurisprudence.
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that the "unofficial
portrait"-though behind the scenes-is what "really" dominates the French
civil judicial system. 29' This Article demonstrates that the unofficial portrait's
discourse of policy hermeneutics has not simply replaced the formalism of the
official portrait. The discourse of grammar continues to be maintained, both
in the syllogistic official judicial decision and in certain portions of conclusions
and rapports. Thus, the official portrait of the French civil judge-who
291. The French civil judge is not simply a duplicitous character who craftily masks his lawmaking
behind the convenient fagade offered by the official French portrait. Cf. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 431
(suggesting such a conclusion); MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 47-48, 151 (same). Similarly, the reality goes
beyond a historical narrative seeking to mirror the now-canonical history of American legal theory, as
described, for instance, by Roberto Unger. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
92-97 (1975). It would be, after all, quite easy to describe the trajectory of French legal consciousness as
mirroring its American counterpart. In France, this easy historical narrative would trace an evolution from
the 19th-century formalism of the School of Exegesis, to the early 20th-century analytic and realist critique
of "free scientific research" (G6ny), to contemporary policy orientation (Carbonnier, Tunc). Such a narrative
would tend to suggest, in direct contradiction to the analysis conducted in this Article, that an era of purely
grammatical reading has been supplanted by an equally pure hermeneutic one.
1402 [Vol. 104: 1325
Judicial Portraits
passively, mechanically, almost mathematically applies the generative matrix
of the controlling legal text-still exists, and it continues to hold a central
position in the French civil judicial system. This official portrait continues to
be far too carefully maintained to be dismissed as mere window dressing. It
is the result, as Dawson points out, of the French Revolution's defining
historical and cultural influence. Because of the deep cultural distrust of the
judiciary, and the resulting establishment of certain rigid constraints, the
French judicial opinion took, and continues to take, its prototypically
grammatical form.
The second conclusion is that the form of the official French judicial
opinion, which resists the overt introduction of hermeneutics, has led to the
bifurcation of French judicial discourse. The official French judicial decision
thus maintains its grammatical discourse, and hermeneutic discourse surfaces
elsewhere (in the rapports, conclusions, and doctrine).-' - Neither discourse,
in and of itself, independently of the other, represents "what is really going on"
in the French civil judicial system. The bifurcation of French judicial discourse
into distinct spheres thus represents the French judicial system's mediation
between, on the one hand, France's historically and culturally determined
distrust of the judiciary, and on the other, the post-G6ny impulse towards
socially responsive judicial hermeneutics. Both directives remain
simultaneously operative.
The third conclusion is that the French judicial system's discursive split
produces certain paradoxical and heretofore unnoticed effects. In particular, the
insistence on grammar results in an increased sensitivity to its perceived
failures. This sensitivity manifests itself in the discourse of the unofficial
portrait, which, as we have seen, is remarkably candid about perceived gaps,
conflicts, or ambiguities in the Code.
The discussion of perceived legislative flaws results in the questioning, in
unofficial judicial discourse, of how to "construct a solution." The French
magistrat faced with a perceived legislative lacuna, for example, therefore
draws upon sources explicitly identified as external to the statutory law, such
as doctrine293 and jurisprudence. The result is that the unofficial judicial
292. I do not, by any means, intend to suggest that French judicial decisions are purely grammatical.
nor that rapports, conclusions, and doctrine are purely hermeneutic. I only mean to say that insofar as
overtly hermeneutic discourse surfaces in the French legal system. it does so in the rapports, conclusions.
and doctrine.
293. Hence the exalted status of the law professor in the French legal system. Antoine Garapon speaks
of the French legal system's veritable "cult of professors." lnterview with Antoine Garapon. Director of
the Institut des Hautes Etudes sur ]a Justice, in Paris. France (Mar. 1994). Merryman describes "the teacher-
scholar" as "the real protagonist of the civil law tradition." MERRYMAN, supra note 7. at 59-60. The
writings of Gny, Carbonnier, and Tunc are therefore essential to an understanding of the French judicial
system. These three professors are constantly cited within the unofficial discourse of the French magistrar.
as are the specialists of given legal fields. Other than the reference to such professors within the space of
French magistrats' unofficial discourse, the exalted status of the law professor manifests itself in another
way. I refer here to the institution of the "doctrinal note," which represents the French equivalent of
American law-review case comments. The major difference, other than the fact that they are produced by
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construction of a solution occurs in an explicitly embattled field. The rapport
or conclusions almost invariably presents some controversy of either doctrine
or jurisprudence. Professor X's opinion, for example, which criticizes the First
Chamber's solution, is presented as conflicting with Professor Y's. In short,
once the French magistrat considers that the grammar of the Code does not
generate a required outcome, she finds herself in a contested hermeneutic field
where she must choose among the various conflicting positions. She must
partake in the open legal debate and speaks as a subjective individual, arguing
in favor of the adoption of one position among many. In her unofficial
discourse, the French civil judge is highly personalized, and is less than
confident in the ability of hermeneutics (especially policy hermeneutics) to
generate required interpretive solutions. She routinely emerges as an "I" who
argues to her colleagues, now personalized as "you." Her arguments, now
presented as offering nothing more than her personal opinion, are littered with
subjective phrases such as "it seems to me," or "insofar as I am concerned."
The bifurcation of French civil judicial discourse has thus resulted in the
coexistence of two remarkably different discursive spheres. How can such
different spheres coexist without one dominating the other? Framed in other
terms: Unless the official portrait is mere window dressing, how can the
French judiciary rationalize what it does in its unofficial discursive sphere? Is
the French judiciary simply blind to the apparent conflicts between the policy
hermeneutics in which it engages in its unofficial discourse and the perfectly
passive, grammatical application that is dictated by the official portrait of the
French civil judge?
French civil judges are not blind to this tension. The fourth conclusion is
that the French legal system has constructed a series of basic mediating
concepts that facilitate, explain, rationalize, and justify the coexistence of the
official and unofficial portraits of the role of the French civil judge. These
fundamental mediating concepts have emerged as the primary concerns of
French academic doctrine since the publication of G6ny's devastating critique
of nineteenth-century French formalism, and as the recurrent issues in
unofficial French judicial discourse.
The sources of the law, the endless preoccupation of French academic
doctrine, is one such mediating concept. It represents an uneasy compromise
between the official portrait and the critiques that contemporary French
academics have leveled against that portrait. It recognizes the creative role
played by the French civil judiciary, while simultaneously denying the
resulting judicial norms the status of "Law." Judges create judicial norms
(especially when a case demonstrates the existence of a legislative gap) that in
major academics, is that they are published immediately after important judicial decisions in the law reports
themselves. The American equivalent would be for the West Reports to publish, immediately following a
Supreme Court decision, an analysis by Professor X.
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fact function as if they were Law, but that does not mean that these judicial
norms are Law. Only the legislature can create Law, so judicial decisions
cannot, by definition, be a source of the Law. Hence jurisprudence can only
function-to use G6ny's term, as taken up once again by Carbonnier-as a
mere "authority."
The debate over the sources of the law thus operates as a mediating
concept that rationalizes the hermeneutic activity of the judge in the unofficial
discursive sphere, while salvaging as much as possible of the official French
conception of the grammatically oriented code system. The treatment of the
sources of the law posits a status relation between the official and unofficial
judicial discourses that denies the unofficial judicial discourse the status of
Law, but in so doing permits and justifies its very existence. The official
portrait of the French civil judge, which might have been challenged by the
creative policy hermeneutics of the civil judge, is thus maintained and justified
as well.
Several of the recurrent argumentative modes characteristic of French
conclusions and rapports function as similar concepts that mediate between the
official and unofficial portraits of the role of the French civil judge. The
concept of legal adaptation or modernization, for example, necessarily thrusts
the civil judge into a hermeneutic mode of reading in which she must produce
interpretations of the law that are meaningful to a changing society. This is not
surprising; the point of such calls for "modernizing" interpretations is to get
away from grammatical or formalist applications of the law, which are
perceived to be socially unresponsive. Such modernizing interpretations of the
law, however, leave the literal wording of the statutory law intact. After all,
when the Cour de cassation adapts or modernizes its reading of Article X of
the Civil Code, Article X remains formally unchanged. This permits the French
judge to perform hermeneutic interpretations of the statutory law without
explicitly threatening the formal grammar of the Code. The French civil judge
can interpret creatively on the basis of policy hermeneutics, yet the statutory
law can still be seen as controlling the judge's decisions. -
In the French civil judicial system, the concept of equity functions in a
similar manner. On the one hand, equity posits that the judge and the law serve
some sort of social function (however vaguely defined). It thus calls for the
judge to produce meaningful, hermeneutic readings in terms of the "social
reality" that exists "outside" of the statutory law. On the other hand, as is the
case with judicial modernization of the law, the statutory law itself remains
formally unchanged and relatively unthreatened. Equity does not imply that the
294. Although it may appear paradoxical to the common law junst. French academics have therefore
frequently praised the flexibility or "suppleness" of their codified legal system. Se. e g. Jean Boulanger.
Notations sur le pouvoir criateur de la jurisprudence civile. 59 REVUE TRIMESTRIEI E DE DRorr CIVIL
[R. TRIM. D. CIv.] 417 (1961); Adhdmar Esmein, Lajunspnidence e la doctnne. I R. TRIt D Civ 5.
12 (1902).
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statutory law in general, or the particular article of statutory law in question,
or even the grammatical application of the statutory law should always be
discarded. To the contrary, it only implies that on certain, relatively rare
occasions the statutory law should be read in a different manner in order to
avoid absurd or unjust judicial solutions. The concept of equity marginalizes
these relatively rare, aberrant cases that equity itself corrects. By negative
inference, not only does the great mass of formally applied statutory law
subsist unchanged, but it finds itself justified as well.
In the French civil judicial system, the mediation between passive
grammatical application and socially responsive, hermeneutic interpretation of
the statutory law takes a physical incarnation as well, in the form of the
advocate general. The role of the advocate general is to ensure the proper
application of the statutory law and to pursue society's interest in the public
welfare.295 The advocate general's mediating position between the legal case
and society at large, as well as between the judges and the parties, manifests
itself procedurally. An advocate general presents his conclusions after the
parties have argued their respective positions and before the judges retire for
deliberations. He is a magistrat who has access to the rapport, but who does
not partake in the judicial deliberations or voting. The advocate general
therefore functions as the institutional and physical manifestation, in the French
judicial system, of the mediation between the formal grammar of "proper
application of the statutory law" and the hermeneutic of "public welfare."
The advocates general are not only aware of their double duties, but also
appear to be quite conscious of their role as mediator between them. In an
article on the role of the advocates general at the Cour de cassation, for
example, Advocate General Charbonnier begins by stressing their "social
dimension": Advocates general are "the representatives of the social interest.
They have especially as their role ... to ensure that a certain dimension of
justice be respected, namely its social dimension .... According to a formula
that is as true as it is hackneyed, they defend society., 296 Charbonnier then
offers the mediating twist: Advocates general "defend [society] by defending
the statutory law. This law represents, by definition, the interest of all, and the
advocate general himself represents this interest as well. 297 The mediation
is straightforward: The advocate general defends the social interest by
defending the statutory law.
According to Charbonnier, by ensuring that the statutory law is correctly
applied in instances where it is clear, and correctly interpreted in instances
where it is ambiguous, the advocate general fulfills his "high mission of
[promoting] the general interest., 298 It is through him that "the interpretation
295. See supra part IV.B.I.
296. Lucien Charbonnier, Minist~re public et Cour supreme, in 1989 ANN. REP. 127, 128 (1990).
297. Id. at 129.
298. Id.
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of the statutory law" and the "combination of rules of law" are fixed; "it is
through him that jurisprudence is elaborated. "299 It is he who helps the Cour
de cassation in its ever-increasing role as "paralegislator." ''  On the one
hand, the advocate general's mode of interpretation appears to be patently
hermeneutic: He must attempt "to bring out the[] meaning" of legislative
provisions, taking into account "the social and economic realities"; and he
must seek "to arrive at a better perception of the practical effects" of the
proposed solutions of jurisprudence.3° ' On the other hand, the role of the
advocate general, argues Charbonnier, is to ensure that the Cour properly
exercises, via the judicial syllogism, the deductive reasoning of the
geometrician; it is by the logical operation of legal principles that justice is
assured. 30 2 Formal grammar and social hermeneutics therefore combine in the
advocate general. As Charbonnier states, in a sentence that demonstrates the
full extent of the mediation: "[The advocate general's] domain is that of the
fundamental realities, that is to say, [legal] principles.'"
The conclusion to be drawn is not that the French civil judicial system
maintains two apparently contradictory modes of reading-and thus two
apparently contradictory portraits of the judicial role-that are separated into
different, perfectly pure discursive spheres, and that these contradictions are
mediated by some basic concepts and institutions. The fifth conclusion is that
while the French civil judicial system maintains two distinct modes of reading,
the two are completely interdependent, constantly leaking into each other and
at no point pure.
Traces of policy hermeneutics in the apparently pure, grammatical
discourse of the official French judicial decision unquestionably exist. Given
the bifurcation of French judicial discourse, however, they can be difficult to
recognize. The Cour's decision in the comparative negligence case offers a fine
example.3°4 The Cour's official decision states: "[W]hereas, consequently, the
conduct of the victim, if it was not unforeseeable and unavoidable for the
custodian, cannot exonerate him, even partially."0'35 The simple inclusion of
the words "even partially" in the prototypically formal discourse of the Cour's
decision represents not only the Cour's rejection of its own comparative
negligence rule, but also the trace of an entire discursive sphere in which
French judges interpret on the basis of elaborate policy hermeneutics. The two
words, "even partially," represent a gateway of enormous proportions; those
two words permit the incursion-however encoded it may be-of social,
299. Id. at 133.
300. Id. at 131.
301. Id. at 134.
302. Id. at 137, 139.
303. Id. at 141.
304. See supra part lI.D.
305. Conclusions of Charbonnier, supra note 27 1. at 452 (emphasis added).
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economic, and institutional policy arguments, as well as of equity and legal
adaptation considerations.
The Cour's decision in the case regarding palimony for "natural" and
"adulterine" children offers a similar example. 06 The Cour states, as the
basis of its decision, "Given Article 342(2) of the Civil Code;-Whereas the
palimony action foreseen by this text can only be entertained if brought by a
natural, adulterine or incestuous child, 307 despite the fact that Article 342,
at the time of the suit, said nothing at all about "natural" children. The
inclusion of the word "natural" represents the trace, in the grammatical
discourse of the official French judicial decision, of the French judiciary's
unofficial hermeneutics.
The incursion of hermeneutics into the grammar of the judicial decision
arguably represents the most significant moment of the French civil judicial
decision. The answer to the question "What are the holdings of the two cases
we have just been discussing?" would have to include the words "even
partially" and "natural child." The formal grammar of the official French
judicial decision is thus quite dependent on the French judiciary's unofficial
policy hermeneutics.
The French judicial system's unofficial discourse is similarly dependent on
formal grammar. This dependence manifests itself on two levels. First, the
French judge tends to seek recourse to hermeneutic reading only when he faces
a perceived gap, conflict, or ambiguity in the grammar of the statutory law.
The presumption remains that most of the time the statutory law can simply
be "applied" grammatically. The exercise of judicial policy hermeneutics is
perceived to be entirely dependent on the breakdown of formal grammar.
The second level in which the unofficial discourse depends on grammar
involves the return of formalist grammar after the turn to policy hermeneutics.
French unofficial discourse does not remain purely hermeneutic once it is
deployed. To the contrary, the turn to hermeneutics precipitates the production
of formal judicial norms. The rapport in the wrongful death case involving the
concubine, for instance, methodically presents the applicable judicial
norms.3°8 "The Second Civil Chamber requires," Justice Combaldieu states,
"according to the well-known formulation, 'violation of a legally protected,
legitimate interest."'' 3°9 The rhetoric that accompanies the presentation of
such "required" judicial norms is that of formalist, grammatical reading. In the
conclusions and rapports, it is almost always a question of "applying" the
relevant rule, principle, or solution of jurisprudence."'
306. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
307. Conclusions of Lindon, supra note 205, at 432 (emphasis added).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62.
309. Rapport of Combaldieu, supra note 160, at 184, 186 (emphasis added).
310. See supra part IV.C.2.b.
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The turn to judicial hermeneutics thus eventually leads to the production
of formal judicial norms that are accompanied by the rhetoric of grammatical
"application." These formal judicial norms, just like the formal statutory laws
that they have displaced, will also be read both grammatically and
hermeneutically, hence the modification and overturning of jurisprudence on
the basis of equity and policy considerations, legal adaptation arguments, and
the like. The hermeneutics of unofficial French judicial discourse thus reveals
itself to be quite dependent on formal grammar, which is, itself, dependent on
hermeneutics.
The interdependence of grammar and hermeneutics is perhaps most explicit
in the expression "the doctrine of the Cour." On the one hand, the expression
retains its traditional connotation of "academic doctrine," thus implying
subjective, hermeneutic reading on the basis of sociopolitical theories. On the
other hand, the expression now possesses the relatively new meaning of
"judicial doctrine," implying the grammatical application of formal and
authoritative judicial norms.
The irony of this interdependence of grammar and hermeneutics is that
formal grammar (judicial doctrine) surfaces in the discursive sphere of the
unofficial portrait (the explicitly hermeneutic sphere of judicial-style "'academic
doctrine") because it was perceived to have failed in the discursive sphere of
the official portrait (the explicitly grammatical sphere of the judicial
"application" of the formal dictates of the statutory law). The production of
formal judicial norms, which is explicitly forbidden by the grammar of the
official French portrait of the judicial role, is precisely what permits the return
of formal grammar in the French judicial system.
The cycle of the French civil judicial system can be summed up in the
following sequence: (i) formal grammar of the statutory law; (ii) the perceived
breakdown of the statutory law's formal grammar; (iii) the turn to policy
hermeneutics in order to fix the breakdown; (iv) the return of grammar as
formal judicial norms; (v) the perceived breakdown of the formal grammar of
the judicial norms; and (vi) the turn to policy hermeneutics in order to fix the
breakdown, and so on. Grammar is salvaged and reproduced by hermeneutics,
which itself exists because of the perceived failure of grammar.
VI. CONCLUSION
The French civil judicial system offers two portraits of the judicial role.
The official portrait is produced by legislative provisions, judicial interpretation
and application of these provisions, and the formal structure of the French
judicial decision. It presents the judge as grammatically applying the statutory
law. The unofficial portrait is produced by doctrine and the argumentation of
magistrats. It presents the judge as producing socially meaningful responses
to current legal problems on the basis of policy hermeneutics.
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In fact, the bifurcated discourse of the French civil judicial system consists
of a perpetual intermixing of grammar and hermeneutics. The fundamental
mediating concepts such as the sources of the law, legal adaptation, or equity
do not mediate between two contradictory modes of reading. Rather, they
merely facilitate the coexistence and imbrication of two modes of reading
(represented by two modes of discourse) that do not-and perhaps
cannot-exist independently of each other. The French judicial system has
apparently found that it cannot simply choose between formalism and
hermeneutics. Both modes of reading are always available, but each relies on,
implicates, and resorts to the other.
